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Abstract 
A plethora of ink has been spilled demonstrating the relationship between 
economics and voter behavior. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of scholarship 
has concentrated on the empirical assessment of economic voting within the context of 
developed countries. The present thesis widens the scope of study by testing the 
applicability of the classic economic voting theory (CEVT) strictly within developing 
countries. The results suggest that while voters in developing countries do take the 
economy into account, they do so in a manner that’s partially different from what CEVT 
predicts. Voters in developing countries simultaneously assume both retrospective 
sociotropic and prospective sociotropic characteristics. Furthermore, economic voting in 
the developing world takes place within an asymmetrical framework of punishment and 
reward. The findings suggest that choice theory and its derivative CEVT are ill-equipped 
at explaining economic voting behavior in developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 This research would have not been possible without the exceptional input by 
members of my committee alongside distinguished UNLV professors. First, an 
insurmountable amount of gratitude is owed to Dr. Michele Kuenzi and committee 
member Dr. David Damore for introducing me to the study of economic voting in their 
seminar on comparative political behavior. I also want to thank committee members Dr. 
Christian Jensen, Dr. Thomas Carroll, and Dr. Bernard Malamud for providing me with 
theoretical and methodological advice. I want to especially thank Dr. John Tuman for not 
only chairing my committee but for realizing the passion that I have for the study of 
economic voting and for guiding that passion to its result. The initial concept behind this 
thesis was to provide one of the most comprehensive accounts of economic voting in the 
developing world, and under the guidance of Dr. Tuman I was able to theoretically, 
methodologically, and coalesce my research agenda.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………...iii 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………iv 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………...vi 
Chapter 1. Introduction………………………..……………………………………1 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework………………………………………………….14 
Chapter 3. Literature Review……………………………………………………….34  
Chapter 4. Research Design………………………………………………………...66 
Chapter 5. Empirical Results and Discussion……………………………………....81 
Chapter 6. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………...113 
Appendix A. Surveys of Existent Works in the Developing World…………..…....122 
Appendix B. Tabulation between Vote Intention and Economic Perceptions……...128 
Appendix C. Country and Election Samples………………………………………..131 
Appendix D: Significance of Economic Covariates in all Trials……………………134 
Appendix E. Comparison of LDV and AR1 Methods ……………………………..135 
References…………………………………………………………………………..136 
Curriculum Vitae…………………………………………………………………....154 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 4.1: Perceptions of the Economy questionnaires……………………………..77  
Table 5.1: Cross-Regional Regression Results……………………………………...82 
Table 5.2: Regional Regression Results…………………………………………….87 
Table 5.3: Latin America, 1980 – 1988……………………………………………..89 
Table 5.4: Central and Eastern Europe, 1990 – 1992……………………………….91 
Table 5.5: Micro-level economic voting correlation matrix………………………...93 
Table 5.6: Cross-regional, micro-level economic voting…………………………...96 
Table 5.7: Individual-level Voter Heterogeneity…………………………………...98 
Table 5.8: Multi-level Economic Voting…………………………………………...99 
Table 5.9: Micro-level Latin American economic voting…………………………103 
Table 5.10: Micro-level African economic voting………………………………...104 
Table 5.11: Asymmetry of Voting………………………………………………...110 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Does economics influence voter behavior? A plethora of studies since 1970 have 
attempted to quantitatively assess the connection between economics and elections, 
ultimately producing a dominant perspective on voter behavior referred to as economic 
voting. Relying on the responsibility hypothesis within democratic theory, which notes 
that voters hold governments responsible for the management of economic policy, the 
economic voting perspective asserts that electoral outcomes are partially influenced by 
economic matters. The theory consists of numerous dimensions: valence, positional and 
patrimonial economic voting. An overwhelming majority of the works have assumed a 
valence dimension, engaging in reductionism through the application of the parsimonious 
classic economic voting model
1
.  In other words, valence economic voting makes the 
assumption that the electoral decision-making of the citizenry is based on its evaluation 
of the economy. Elections thus become merel-y “a referendum on the economic 
performance of the incumbent government” (Duch 2001, 895).  
The voluminous literature on economic voting, which today exceeds eight-
hundred works, has to a large extent concentrated on a parsimonious interpretation of 
economic voting. Valence economic voting, or what will be referred to as the classic 
economic voting theory (CEVT), has been the dominant form of economic voting in the 
majority of scholarship. While the existence of CEVT has been overwhelmingly 
demonstrated, its application has been limited to the United States and Western Europe. 
The growing consensus on the presence of economic voting in the developed world has 
                                                 
1
 Throughout the paper valence economic voting and classic economic voting theory will be used 
interchangeably. In essence, scholarship has attributed valence economic voting as the classic economic 
voting theory. 
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largely been settled, with recent studies shifting towards the application of alternative 
dimensions of economic voting (e.g. Lewis-Beck et. al., 2010; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 
2011; Lewis-Beck et al., 2012; Foucault et. al., 2013; Stubager et. al., 2013). Sadly, the 
developing world has failed to receive its equal share of scholarly attention. Despite the 
recent scholarly interest in developing countries, the share of research and academic ink 
spilled still dwarfs that of advanced industrial democracies.    
The aim of the following thesis is fill the vacuum with a comprehensive account 
of economic voting in the developing world. The paper seeks to understand whether the 
theoretical framework and methodological tools that are incorporated into CEVT are 
applicable within developing democracies. Does prospect theory provide an alternative 
theoretical framework? Methodologically, do studies of economic voting in the 
developing world suffer from the so-called “Kramer problem” or the inability of 
subjective micro-level results to mirror aggregate objective findings? Due to a lack of 
cross-national studies, questions still linger on the application of economic voting in the 
developing world. If economic voting is present, then what is its determinant? 
Furthermore, how does economic voting in developing countries compare with mature 
democracies?  
A comprehensive study of economic voting in the developing world is vital 
towards understanding the saliency of the paradigm. Since the overwhelming majority of 
states are classified as developing countries, research into the economic voting patterns of 
the developing world can provide greater inferential power and universality of the 
economic voting research agenda. Furthermore, unlike past works that solely concentrate 
on a fraction of countries, the majority of whom are economically and politically 
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developed states, a concentration on developing democracies can help the discipline 
better grasp the economic character of the majority of territories and individuals. 
Why Study Economic Voting in Developing Countries? 
This study defines developing countries as such states which are in the process of 
consolidating democratic and economic institutions. Such nations not only lack the 
mature economic structure present in western societies, but also the notion of 
consolidated democracy. According to Cheibub and Przeworski (1999), there are four 
criteria used to identify democracies. They include (1) election of the chief executive; (2) 
election of the legislature; (3) multiparty elections; (4) and the loss of power and yielding 
of office by incumbent parties. Since the following research is strictly oriented around 
legislative elections in the developing world, the first criterion will be omitted in the 
identification of case study inclusion. The fourth criterion is also problematic when 
assessing legislative election in such countries as Botswana. The small African country of 
Botswana is held as a beacon for democracy in numerous analyses, yet the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) has yet to lose a parliamentary election. As such, Cheibub and 
Przeworski’s fourth criterion will also be omitted.   
A further classification of developing countries is based on the International 
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook country classification. The latter divides the 
world into two categories: (1) advanced economies and (2) emerging and developing 
economies
2
.  Thus, the list of countries in the following study includes members of the 
                                                 
2
 The reason for the reliance on the Fund’s definition of a developing economy is that it provides the most 
accurate classification of developing countries. For example, The United Nation’s World Economic 
Situation and Prospects (WESP) classifies countries into three categories: developed economies, economies 
in transition and developing economies. Under the WESP standards countries such as Bulgaria, Romania 
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Fund’s emerging and developing economies list. Furthermore, to properly test the role of 
economics on elections in developing democracies, a method of election inclusion needs 
to be established. The following study uses the Polity IV democracy score index to merit 
electoral inclusion. To be considered a developing democracy, a developing country must 
at least attain a Polity score of six or above
3
.  
Developing countries provide an intriguing atmosphere to quantify the role of the 
economy in electoral decision-making. First, developing countries tend to display greater 
levels of macroeconomic volatility (Rodrik, 2001) and variance in economic performance 
(Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Gelineau, 2013). An overwhelming majority of developing 
countries have witnessed an unprecedented form of economic change and uncertainty. 
Whether due to the ills of import substitution industrialization (ISI) or the transition from 
a central planned economy, the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms in the 
developing world brought with it economic shock therapy in the form of rapid growth-led 
economic policies which created volatile business cycles, increased social inequality and 
ultimately created an atmosphere of economic uncertainty. Thus, the volatile nature of the 
economic transformation in the developing world gives continuous saliency of economic 
issues during electoral periods. Granted that different regions experienced different forms 
and degrees of economic shock, the fact still remains that the economy is of greater 
concern in the developing world. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Hungary along with the newly European Union members are classified as developed economies. The 
IMF however classifies such countries as developing economies. Although the formulas differ between the 
two intergovernmental organizations, The Fund refrains from lumping all EU members into the 
‘developed’ category and instead differentiates between member economies. Thus, the Fund provides a 
substantially accurate portrayal of the groups of nation-states  
3
 A country such as China, while an emerging and developing economy, lacks the political characteristics 
to be considered a developing democracy and is excluded from the study.     
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Studies have shown that the level of the economy’s salience increases during 
recessionary periods (Singer, 2011). The fact that economic issues tend to rise during 
periods of economic downturns, furthers the notion that voters use economic-based 
heuristics in the voting booth. Furthermore, since greater economic volatility leads to 
increased chances of economic downturns, we expect that the increased number of bad 
economic times to further increase the chances of the presence of economic voting in the 
developing world. In addition, historical responses to economic crisis have differed in 
developing countries from their developed counterparts. Whereas economic crisis in the 
latter triggered economic models that favor Keynesian-type government intervention, 
economic crisis in the former led to the opposite effect. Examples such as the 1982 debt 
crisis in Latin America and the economic collapse of centralized market economics in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union triggered laissez-faire policies that aimed to 
decrease the role of government in society and the market. As such, voters in developing 
countries naturally may very well place economics at the forefront of their voting 
function in higher levels than voters in developed countries. 
Second, the infant nature of political parties combined with the overwhelming 
presence of electoral volatility in the developing world casts further optimism towards the 
presence of economic voting. The so-called “Michigan model” notes that the voting 
function is determined by a combination of both short-term and long-term factors (Lewis-
Beck et al., 2009; Nadeau et al., 2013). Whereas economics tends to be included in short-
term factors, party identification and ideology are assumed to be long-term factors. This 
is due to the fact that the influence of the latter tends to be more durable and consistent 
from election to election. In developed countries long term factors such as party 
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identification and ideology may influence economic assessments, thus blurring the direct 
association between economics and electoral outcomes. In fact scholarship critiquing 
economic theories of voting has noted that one’s perception of the economy is influenced 
by one’s political orientation (Evans and Andersen, 2006; Evans and Pickup, 2010). As 
such, it is politics that causes perceptions in the economy. In developing world the notion 
of party identification as a long-term, stable indicator is absent due not only to the infant 
nature of political organizations, but also the electoral volatility present in the political 
environment. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) trace the presence of electoral volatility in 
Latin America, noting that the meltdown of party platforms has led to “a volatile situation 
in which political identities and organizations loyalties are recomposed from one election 
to the next” (Robert and Wibbels, 575). This then results in the fracturing of the bonds 
between political parties and social constituencies. Although, concentrating on the 
explanations of electoral volatility in Latin America, the authors draw parallels with 
electoral volatility present in the former Soviet bloc territories. In all, the lack of a solid 
foundation of party identification and a volatile electoral environment, hinder the ability 
of long-term factors to be substantially influential in developing countries.  
Third, many developing countries lack the proper financial capacity and 
institutional mechanisms to ensure an adequate standard of living for their citizenry, thus 
resulting in limited social safety nets (Gelineau, 2013). Dani Rodrik (2001) has attributed 
economic insecurity in Latin America towards the weakening of social insurance 
institutions in the wake of neoliberal reforms. The fact that developing countries possess 
greater percentage of poor citizens, makes the citizenry of developing countries 
demonstrate greater orientation of economic voting (Singer and Gelineau, 2010). 
  
7 
 
Despite the theoretical optimism of economic voting in the developing world, 
there are factors that also may impede its presence. Most prominently, the dominance of 
candidate-centered politics in the developing world combined with the presence of the 
corruptive voting practices may limit the influence economics may have on the vote 
function. Instances of voting, based on financial reward has all too often dominated 
electoral politics in the developing world. For example, voting in the former Soviet 
republics have been plagued by corruptive practices which includes associates of 
incumbent parties canvassing for voters who are willing to “trade” their vote for a lump-
sum monetary amount. Such practices thus may impede the existence of economic 
voting.  
In addition, voters in developing countries lack the necessary experience with 
democracy and the overall political process of voting (Fidrmuc, 2000a). The infant 
democratic nature of developing countries creates weak accountability standards and the 
inability to cast an economic vote. Voters in developing countries may also lack the 
sophistication threshold to hold incumbents responsible for economic matters (But see: 
Benton, 2005). Duch (2001) concludes that individuals possessing low levels of 
information and trust are less likely to engage in economic voting, while the citizenry 
with high levels of information and trust are more likely to engage in economic voting. 
That said, literature on economic voting and the age of democracy is split. While 
Remmer (1991) finds that age of democracy is not associated with the strength of 
electoral responsibility to economic conditions, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2009) 
conclude that CEVT increases with the maturity of democracy.  
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Developing countries may exhibit “pain tolerance” in which voters may not 
attribute economic downturns towards the incumbent if it lacks a proper threshold. 
Indeed Coffey (2013) finds that voters in the Czech Republic demonstrate a level of 
inflation and unemployment pain tolerance, whereby voters refrain from punishment of 
the incumbent until inflation reaches thirteen percent and unemployment exceeds eight 
percent. This speaks volume towards the notion that voters in the developing world may 
become accustom towards expected  economic slumps and fail to readily cast an 
economic vote, unless there is an unexpected shift in economic indicators.   
Finally, there has been substantial work dedicated towards understanding how 
clarity of responsibility mediates the economic vote (e.g. Powell and Whitten, 1993; 
Whitten and Palmer, 1999; Royed et al., 2000; Nadeau et al., 2002; Parker-Stephen, 
2013). Given that most developing countries contain multiple and complex political 
parties and alliances, which at times lack a substantial party platform or ideology, voters 
may be unable to clearly assign responsibility of economic conditions onto the proper 
incumbent. In other words, if clarity of responsibility is blurred due to complex 
institutional rules and multiple political parties then economic voting might be limited or 
simply nonexistent.  
To summarize, the verdict is still out on whether the developing world is ripe for 
economic voting. Optimists note that unlike developed countries which have mature 
political party systems, thus limiting the role of economics in the voting function, 
developing countries lack the mature partisan structure. The role of the economy tends to 
be more salient in developing countries than their developed counterparts due to the fact 
that the former have witnessed greater levels of economic volatility. These initially 
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theoretical arguments cast a promising vision, yet despite such heuristics that the 
presence economic voting may be more salient in developing countries, the infant nature 
of democracy and complex structure of democratic institutions in such countries may blur 
the clarity of responsibility that is needed to assign blame and reward by voters. 
Furthermore, the lack of voter sophistication may further limit the nature of economic 
voting. All in all, the lack of a clear theoretical promise on the prospects of economic 
voting in the developing world makes the research a more intriguing case study.  
Is the Even-Handed Approach of Valence Economic Voting Applicable to 
Developing Countries? 
 A central tenant of the CEVT is the even-handed approach of punishment and 
reward. Voters are assumed to reward the incumbent for prosperous economic times and 
punish the incumbent during recessionary periods in a symmetrical manner. The notion 
of asymmetric behavior in voting was presented in the American context by the 
pioneering works of Louis Bean (1940) and Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, 
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes (1960), and while subsequent works have 
attempted to empirically test the notion of a symmetric distribution of punishment and 
reward within the economic voting realm, the overall idea of whether economic voting is 
asymmetric has largely been neglected. Of the works dedicated to asymmetric economic 
voting, most have concentrated on developed countries. Scholarship in this area has not 
been able to settle the question whether economic voting is symmetric (Kiewiet, 1983; 
Lewis-Beck, 1988) or asymmetric (Bean, 1940; Mueller, 1973; Bloom and Price, 1975; 
Radcliff, 1994). 
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 An understanding of whether economic voting behavior in developing countries is 
symmetric or asymmetric is vital to the strength and applicability of CEVT. If voting is 
symmetric, thus lacking a statistically significant differentiation between economic 
prosperity and economic downturn, then voters fail to place unequal weight on either 
positive or negative economic events. If, however, voting is asymmetric, then economic 
voting in the developing world deviates from the even-handed approach in CEVT. 
Furthermore, if voting is asymmetric, is it a positive bias or negative bias? A plethora of 
social psychological research notes that individuals place greater weight on negative 
events than on positive events (for an exceptional review of the literature on negativity 
bias see: Rozin and Royzman, 2001). However, the presence of negativity bias is far from 
being universal (e.g. Matlin and Stang, 1978) 
Overview 
The following study is comprised of six chapters. The second chapter assesses the 
theoretical foundations of economic voting. Drawing on rational choice theory from 
economics and democratic theory from political science, economic voting is the 
byproduct of the fusion of both theoretical frameworks. The chapter traces the theoretical 
foundations of valence economic voting to VO Key and Anthony Downs, noting that 
despite popular consensus, the theoretical pillars of classic economic voting lacks 
completeness. Specifically, the inclusion of prospect theory to economic voting can 
widen the theoretical scope of the discipline. 
The third chapter provides a review of the literature on economic voting with an 
emphasis on scholarship dedicated towards the developing world. The literature review 
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divides scholarship on economic voting into three epochs. The first period covers the 
“methodological infancy period” which lasted from 1920-1970(71) and lacked the 
methodological depth of econometrics needed to properly model the relationship. The 
latter moment of the infancy period was dominated by works that provided theoretical 
assumptions within the economic voting paradigm. The second period, which lasted from 
1970 – 1986, was a period dominated by methodological debates. The inclusion of 
econometric tools allowed scholars of economic voting to widen the methodological 
spectrum and engage in macro and micro-level analyses. The third-period (1986 – 
current) gave rise to cross-national assessments of the economic voting, settled the notion 
of whether economic voting exists in the developed world, and gave way to the 
application of economic voting in the developing world. From a theoretical perspective, 
the third period also brought forth various critiques of the main theoretical pillars of 
CEVT. 
Chapter four lays out the methodological framework. The study employs a “hard” 
methodological dimension
4
 including the use of various econometric techniques to gain a 
proper understanding of how macroeconomic indicators affect the vote for the incumbent 
party. First, relying on aggregate analyses of the vote function, I employ a multivariate 
regression in order to assess whether economic voting exists in developing countries, and 
if so, what economic indicators influence the vote. Second, I rely on individual-level data 
in order to attempt and establish economic voting at the individual level. Furthermore, I 
perform a test of asymmetric voting in order to understand whether voters in the 
                                                 
4
 A hard methodological dimension implies the concentration and use of quantitative and econometric 
statistical techniques aimed at a mathematical interpretation of the particular phenomenon. A soft 
methodological interpretation focuses on descriptive case studies “that use empirical evidence and logical 
analysis” (Chilcote 1994, 23). 
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developing world suffer from the “grievance asymmetry5” phenomenon. Using the 
Latinobarometer and Afrobarometer, I analyze whether individual voters punish and 
reward in an even-handed manner.  
Chapter five provides the results and discussion of macro and micro-level 
analyses. With regard to the former methodological technique, the results indicate that 
growth rate has a cross-regional association with the vote for the incumbent. In other 
words, in a pooled macro-level model of elections, growth rate is the sole economic 
predictor of incumbent vote. Regionally, growth rate out performs inflation and 
unemployment. However, both inflation and unemployment seem to be time-dependent 
variables, in that they influence the vote during a specific moment in time (e.g. inflation 
during the Latin American debt crisis). At the micro-level, voters assess the economy in a 
retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic fashion. Despite evidence of both 
retrospective and prospective dimensions of economic voting, voters in developing 
countries tend to assume prospective economic evaluations in greater magnitude. This 
counters CEVT, which assumes a retrospective account of economic voting behavior. 
With regard to voter asymmetry, while voters do punish and reward incumbent 
governments, the magnitude of such action differs considerably. Retrospectively, voters 
dish out more punishment for bad economic times than reward the incumbent for good 
economic times. However, when voters evaluate the economy prospectively, they tend to 
reward more than they punish.   
                                                 
5
 First coined by Nanestad and Paldam (1994: 216) 
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Chapter six summarizes the findings within the greater scope of economic voting. 
Does economic voting in the developing world adhere to CEVT principles? If not, what 
are the theoretical tenants of economic voting in the developing world? The answer to the 
former question is two-fold. While macroeconomic indicators perform in expected 
fashion, voters in developing countries tend to be more prospective than retrospective. 
This is partially due to the infant nature of incumbent parties, which theoretically creates 
prospective voters (Singer and Carlin, 2013). However, as the political platform becomes 
more stable and party ideology becomes more durable I expect voters to attain 
retrospective characteristics, thus closely aligning themselves with economic voters in 
mature democracies.  
The thesis widens scope of economic voting in developing countries in several 
ways. Theoretically, it demonstrates that CEVT is not fully compatible with economic 
voting in the developing world. The lack of party platform durability and incumbent 
stability leads voters to assume prospective characteristics in higher probabilities. 
Furthermore, the paper calls for the inclusion of prospect theory in order to have a 
“complete” understanding of the economic voter. Methodologically, the thesis 
demonstrates the prominence of growth rate as a predictor of incumbent vote. Inflation 
and unemployment are time-dependent and only assume predictability during periods of 
region-wide economic distress. The thesis also attempts to console the debate on lag 
structures by demonstrating that lags are feasible during periods of economic stability. 
The economic voter in the developing world is a sociotropic voter that tends to attain 
negativity bias when assessing the economy retrospectively but assumes a positivity-bias 
when assessing the economy prospectively.    
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Foundation 
 The theoretical foundation behind economic voting owes its existence to a fusion 
of the economics-oriented rational theory of choice and the political science-oriented 
democratic responsibility hypothesis. As such, one may envision the theoretical 
framework of economic voting as a hybrid of rational choice and democratic theory. 
Economic voting assumes that if individuals behave rationally in markets, assuming a 
cost-benefit analysis of events, they also behave in similar fashion making choices among 
candidates and parties. In order for voters to act in rational fashion, they must have the 
freedom to do so. This is where democratic theory gains relevance. Reliance on 
democratic theory, specifically the responsibility hypothesis, has allowed a more 
complete understanding of valence economic voting. 
From the Marketplace to the Voting Booth: Rational Choice and Economic Voting 
The foundations of any scientific theory are its assumptions. Whether rational 
choice is a theory, a set of theories (Quackenbush, 2004) or a research tradition (Johnson, 
1996) is beyond the scope of the paper. Regardless of where one stands on the theoretical 
applicability of rational choice, there are several key assumptions that its proponents, and 
critics agree upon. First, rational choice interprets utility maximization as income 
maximization. In other words, the theory has a strict materialistic interpretation of utility. 
Second, rational choice theory assumes that individual decision-making takes place under 
an atmosphere of uncertainty. Third, individuals demonstrate rank-ordered preferences 
that also assume transitivity. An example of transitivity is when A is preferable to B, B is 
preferable to C, thus A is preferable to C. Finally, rational choice assumes that 
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individuals choose a line of action so as to maximize their interests. The totality of such 
actions takes place within a cost-benefit calculus.  
 The importation of rational theory of choice from the study of economics 
occurred during the behavioral revolution by quantitative-oriented social scientists who 
believed that political science would benefit from the use of rational choice theory. Given 
the fact that power is a scarce resource, individuals who pursue power would pursue it in 
a similar fashion as they pursue material utility. Presenting a “coherent and unified 
theoretical view of politics and economics” (Alt and Shepsle 1990, 1), this theoretical 
structure aimed at transforming how one approached the study of politics. Political 
behavior began to be interpreted in utility maximizing terms. Politicians and voters were 
strategic actors who based their decisions on the expected utility from each and every 
action.  
 The influence of rational choice on voting behavior and subsequently economic 
voting is attributed to Anthony Downs’ (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
Downs presented several assumptions of the voting behavior. First, the rational voter 
casts his or her vote based on party differential under a domain of uncertainty. If voters 
had perfect information then the rational voter calculus would simply be the difference 
between the expected utility from the incumbent and the opposition. However, since 
voters lack the information of the expected utility from the opposition party, they must 
hypothetically derive the expected utility. By deriving the hypothetical expected utility 
and subtracting it from the actual utility from the incumbent the voter comes to his or her 
party differential (Downs, 40). Second, voting in a democratic atmosphere, more often 
than not, results in information costs outweighing the benefits of voting. As such, the 
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rational voter may abstain from voting. Since the expected marginal utility from voting in 
a large election is practically nil, the rational voter abstains. Despite the fact that 
information costs hinder the prospect of the rational voter, Downs points to several cost-
cutting heuristics that the rational voter undertakes. Reliance on ideological cues is 
perhaps the most important as its logic is directly linked to positional economic voting. 
As shall be demonstrated below, Downs’ “rational voter” perspective laid the 
groundwork for prospective economic voting.      
V.O Key provided the theoretical grounds for retrospective economic voting. In 
Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (1964) Key demonstrated that the US electorate 
behaved in retrospective fashion, thus the vote reflected judgment of the past 
performance of the incumbent party, rather than the future hypothetical of the opposition. 
Key’s (1966) argument for the rational voter stemmed from the pioneering work, The 
American Voter, in which Campbell et al. (1960) concluded that voters rely heavily on 
partisan identification, as times unknowingly, on the basis of their vote structure. The 
argument was a blow to proponents of Downs, who argued that individuals used rational 
calculus in their vote function. For Key, despite the vast spectrum of individual voter 
behavior, the electorate as a whole behaved “rationally and responsibly”. In short, Key 
concluded that “voters are not fools” (Key 1966, 7). In assessing the nature of American 
midterm elections, Key (1964) described the electorate as “a rational god of vengeance 
and of reward” (Key 1964, 568). 
Key’s famous passage of voters being “a rational god of vengeance and reward” 
depicted the theoretical understanding that the electorate was by nature a retrospective 
protector of democratic accountability through punishment of economic regression and 
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reward of economic prosperity. Key established the retrospective phenomenon of 
economic voting. Downs’ rational voter was more sophisticated and calculating than 
Key’s, able to compare past incumbent performance with future hypothetical platform of 
the opposition. Although Downs failed to categorize a vote as either a strictly 
retrospective or prospective, subsequent literature has attributed prospective economic 
voting to the Downsian logic. 
Theoretical Assumptions of Valence Economic Voting 
Downs and Key are often attributed to as the theoretical pioneers of economic 
voting. Key’s emphasis on retrospective voting and Downs’ prospective, pocketbook-
oriented voter created the theoretical backdrop for economic voting literature. The 
progression of the discipline has recently led to various dimensions of economic voting. 
Although patrimonial economic voting has assumed that voters base their economic 
voting decisions on the degree of possession of high and low risk assets, positional 
economic voting has assumed that voters base their economic vote on ideologically-
oriented issues. The most frequently researched and promising field has been valence 
economic voting. With valence economic voting, the two prominent theoretical 
assumptions are: (1) incumbency-oriented voting (2) and an even-handed reward-
punishment mechanism. 
Under valence economic voting, voters assess the role of the economy and orient 
their action towards the incumbent. If the individual perceives that the economy is in 
poor shape, the incumbent is punished, but if the economy is viewed as prosperous, the 
incumbent is rewarded. In other words, valence economic voting hypothesizes that it is 
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solely the incumbent that is on trial. It also presupposes that voters are solely basing their 
decision towards the incumbent. This clearly differs in positional economic (or issue-
oriented) voting where voters assign action to the political party most close to their issue 
orientation. Thus, for example, under the incumbency-oriented assumption, it is 
incumbency-status that determines judgment of a particular political party. However, in 
positional economic voting, voters target not the incumbent party, but the party 
“delivering their favored economic policy” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009). 
Another theoretical assumption of valence economic voting is the “even-handed” 
approach towards reward and punishment by voters. Voter punishment and reward is 
assumed to be symmetrical. This theoretical assumption has been marked by numerous 
critiques of the even-handed approach. Critics have relied on the negativity bias 
hypothesis from social psychology to question the fact that voters behave in symmetric 
fashion. However, evidence that questions the asymmetric effects between reward and 
punishment has been substantially established in such pioneering works as Kiewiet 
(1983:49) and Lewis-Beck (1988:79).    
Macro-level 
 At the macro-level, valence economic voting presumes that there is a direct 
association between the vote for the incumbent and macroeconomic indicators. Today, 
scholars of economic voting acknowledge that such a relationship is also conditioned 
upon institutional and political contexts among countries. Thus, the reason why economic 
voting may be more prevalent in the United States and United Kingdom than in Italy is 
due to the institutional nature of the political system in the respective countries. Such 
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characteristics as complexity of party coalitions (which are more prevalent in Italy than in 
United Kingdom) cast a blurring effect over the relationship between economics and 
incumbent party, thus creating a complexity between macroeconomic conditions and the 
vote. Since the application of econometrics in economic voting literature, in the early 
1970s, scholars have been able to isolate several macroeconomic indicators, that while 
are unstable, have nonetheless been able to show up in various country studies. 
 Perhaps the most prominent of such variables is output of goods and services in a 
particular economy. Output is normally operationalized as either gross national product 
(GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP). Both GNP and GDP “measure the sum of the 
market values for all final goods and services produced by the economy in a given 
period” (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 2000, 558). The year-to-year fluctuations in output 
are referred to as the growth rate. Growth rate is normally used by economists as a long-
term indicator of economic progression (Weil, 2005). The methodological significance of 
the growth rate in economic voting will be explained in further chapters. However, the 
theoretical assumption here is that output and growth of output positively affects vote for 
the incumbent, while reduction in output and growth of output results in vote loss for the 
incumbent. Growth rate has produced favorable results in past literary works in mature 
democracies (Fair, 1973; Fair, 1978; Wilkin et al., 1997; Palmer and Whitten, 1999; 
Singer 2011). Due to the prominence of output as a determinant of economic voting, I 
hypothesize that: 
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 A second macroeconomic indicator that is abundant in economic voting research 
is unemployment. Traditionally, unemployment is defined as the percentage of the labor 
force that is currently unemployed and seeking employment. Thus it excludes such 
categories as individuals who are not part of the civilian workforce (e.g. people with 
medical conditions who are unable to work, institutionalized population, etc) as well as 
individuals who are underemployed and discouraged from the workforce. Gregory 
Mankiw defines the latter as “individuals who would like to work but have given up 
looking for a job” (Mankiw 2004, 197). Such workers are in fact willing to work but are 
not included as part of the labor pool.  Here the theoretical assumption is that increases in 
the unemployment rate negatively impact the vote for the incumbent, while decreases in 
the unemployment rate result in incumbent vote gain. Although the theoretical 
assumption and methodological application of unemployment provides it substantive 
legitimacy, numerous researchers have critiqued the inclusion of unemployment as an 
economic measure of the vote. Kramer’s (1971) critique of unemployment as a 
determinant of the vote steams from the fact that during normal levels of unemployment, 
the unemployed are usually those individuals who tend to be the least politically active, 
thus having little direct impact on the aggregate vote percentage (Kramer, 139). 
Furthermore Blount (2002) demonstrates that the measure is an economic as well as a 
social indicator. Using factor analysis, Blount’s results demonstrate that unemployment 
tends to load more strongly with the same factor as social issues. 
  On the other hand, unemployment is a unique economic measure due to the fact 
that it is the statistic that is familiar to most people. Growth rates, GDP and even inflation 
tend to be an abstract concept for the electorate, while the rate of unemployment is 
  
21 
 
experienced by many voters who throughout their lifetime may consider themselves 
unemployed (Conover et al., 1986). Interestingly, research has shown that unemployment 
tends to impact the lower class more than the upperclass (Hibbs and Vasilatos, 1982; 
Palmer and Whitten, 2011). 
 The role of unemployment as a determinant of economic voting in the developing 
world is mixed. The fact that many less-developed countries have ambiguous 
unemployment rates casts doubt in the ability to factor the rate of unemployment as an 
economic determinant of the vote. That said, literature on economic voting in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) has provided a consensus on the significance of unemployment. 
However, unemployment in CEE deviates from the assumption in valence economic 
voting. As shall be described in the next chapter, voters in CEE tend to respond to 
positional economic voting, as opposed to valence economic voting. Thus, a leftist party 
benefits, not for its incumbency-status, but for its policy approach. Using Hungary as a 
case study, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2009) demonstrated that while voters resembled 
the positional economic voting perspective following end of the Cold War, recent voter 
behavior has assumed a valence position with leftist parties being punished for high 
unemployment. In other words, over time, the traditional assumption of leftist parties 
being more adept at creating low unemployment has eroded and voters assume a classic 
reward-punishment perspective of incumbent parties. Thus, I hypothesize that 
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 The third and final macroeconomic indicator associated with economic voting is 
inflation. Literature on mature democracies has demonstrated that inflation has an inverse 
relationship with support for the incumbent. In other words, as the level of inflation 
increases, the incumbent party can expect to be punishment at the polls and vice versa. In 
the developing world, inflation has been a significant problem in the former Soviet 
Republics and in Latin America following the debt crisis of 1982. Despite the experience 
with inflation in the developing world, inflation also tends to have greater impact on the 
upper class than the lower class (Hibbs and Vasilatos, 1982). This is due to the fact that 
those with an abundance of monetary instruments are more affected than those with 
lower levels of income. The abundance of low to middle income earners in the 
developing may thus limit the influence of inflation as a determinant of the vote. Thus, I 
hypothesize that  
                                                                                              
                                             
 Economic growth, unemployment and inflation are the three prominent 
macroeconomic indicators used by scholars of economic voting. Although these three 
variables are perhaps the most widely used in both developed and developing countries, 
recent studies have began to widen the pool of economic indicators with recent literature 
experimenting with the stock market (e.g. Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier, 2013) and 
individual assets such as real estate, bank account and portfolio investment in patrimonial 
economic voting literature.  
Micro-level 
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Valence economic voting takes on several theoretical characteristics at the micro-
level. When voters rely on past economic evaluations in order to cast judgment on the 
incumbent government, they act in a retrospective fashion. Influenced by V.O. Key 
(1966), voters who act in retrospective fashion engage in the “role of appraiser of past 
events, past performance and past actions” (Key, 39). The success of the “Keysian” 
theory stems from the fact that it was applied in Kramer’s (1971) seminal work on 
economic voting, its relative parsimonious nature and the success rate in which it has 
been applied in numerous studies(e.g. Kramer, 1971
6
; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983 
Norpoth, 1996).   
The prospective voting model supposes that voters are a concerned with the future 
economic outlook and thus base their voting decision prospectively on the economic 
policies expected of the incumbent. This “Downsian” theory largely assumes a more 
sophisticated assumption of the rational voter by emphasizing the expected voter utility
7
. 
As opposed to the retrospective voter who might ask, how has the economy performed 
under incumbent X, the prospective voter will anticipate the future economic climate 
from policies if the incumbent is reelected. MacKuen et al (1992) note that prospective 
economic voters relate to the rational expectations model (REM). REM notes that voters 
respond to events when they are anticipated, as opposed to simply waiting until they 
occur. Although a few studies have successfully tested the hypothesis (MacKuen et al., 
1992; 1996; Lockerbie, 1992), prospective economic voting has been less prevalent in the 
                                                 
6
 Though Kramer uses a macro-level methodological framework, he notes that economic voting is 
essentially retrospective. 
7
 Interestingly, one can use Downsian logic to further infer that rational voters tend to be retrospective 
voters. One of Downs’ main arguments is that information has a baring cost. From this logic we can infer 
that voters attempt to minimize information cost when voting. Compared to prospective voting, 
retrospective voting requires less sophistication, calculus and information gathering. In other words, a voter 
only needs to recount the previous tenure of the incumbent and infer judgment. 
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literature on mature democracies due to the fact that it relies on high levels of voter 
rationality, including a level of sophistication that accurately forecasts futuristic 
economic events. Recent research has shed light into the lack of prevalence of 
prospective economic voting. Michelitch et al (2012) have demonstrated that the presence 
of prospective economic voting is highly dependent on the “conditional” manner in 
which the prospective question is being asked in survey studies. Thus, it is measurement 
error that has prevented a proper understanding of prospective economic voting. The 
authors conclude that when a prospective question is asked in a conditional manner (i.e. 
How do you think the economy will perform over the next 12 months, if candidate X 
wins?) then prospective economic voting is a significant predictor of the vote. 
 Retrospective and Prospective economic voting are not mutually exclusive. In 
fact, Fiorina (1981) has demonstrated that voters base their prospective judgment on 
retrospective cues. Furthermore, studies have shown the simultaneous presence of both 
theoretical assumptions (Miller and Wattenberg, 1985; Clarke and Stewart, 1994). 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001) assert that it is the political context that determines 
whether retrospective or prospective perceptions will be dominant. In presidential 
elections, when there is an incumbent candidate, voters tend to display retrospective 
characteristics, due to the fact that the electorate uses a retrospective judgment of the 
incumbent to assign blame or reward. In the absence of an incumbent candidate, voters 
tend to engage in prospective behavior.  
Based on the theoretical assumptions presented above, I hypothesize that 
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 Another theoretical dimension of micro-level economic voting is that voters are 
assumed to be either pocketbook or sociotropic voters. Here again we see the influence of 
Downs. Downs’ hypothesized the rational voter, as concerned with one’s own utility 
income, basis his or her voting decision on the maximization that utility income (Downs, 
39). As such, for Downs the rational voter is a pocketbook voter. Given that information 
has a cost-bearing association to the voter, and that sociotropic voting involves greater 
information costs, it is not only the sole reliance on utility income, but also the increasing 
cost of information under sociotropic voting, that a Downsian voter will solely be a 
pocketbook voter. Thus, pocketbook economic voting dictates that voters assess their 
personal economic wellbeing and base their vote on whether their personal economic 
situation has progressed or regressed during the incumbents’ tenure.  
Sociotropic economic voting dictates that voters place emphasis on the wellbeing 
of the overall, national economy (rather than their personal wellbeing) when assessing the 
economic situation. Based on the influence of rational choice theory on economic voting, 
initial hypotheses noted that voters would be egotropic due to the fact that egotropic 
evaluations demand minimal expertise on political issues and directly relate to the 
maximization of one’s utility function. The application of egotropic economic voting in 
early studies did not find support (e.g. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kinder and Kiewiet, 
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1981)
8
. Further studies have solidified the presence of sociotropic economic voting, 
although its universality is still inappropriate to assume, given the presence of an outlier: 
Denmark (Nannestad and Paldam, 1995; 1997a; 1997b; But See Stubager et al., 2014). 
                                                                                       
                                           
                                                                                
               
The mutual exclusivity of pocketbook and sociotropic, and retrospective and 
prospective evaluations has been challenged by recent scholarship (Clarke and Stewart, 
1994; Alvarez and Nagler, 1995; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001). Such studies have 
demonstrated that subjective economic evaluations can simultaneously take on a 
retrospective and prospective approach and a pocketbook and sociotropic approach. That 
said, CEVT assumes that economic voting takes place within a retrospective mindset 
with voters using perceptions of the national economy to cast judgment on the incumbent. 
Thus, the seven hypotheses stated above are the tenants of CEVT and will be applied 
towards developing countries to see whether CEVT embodies a world-wide pool of 
economic voting. 
Grievance Asymmetry and the Importation of Prospect Theory towards Economic 
Voting 
                                                 
8
 At issue is whether sociotropic economic voting is altruistic. While Lewin (1991) dismisses the notion 
that a sociotropic economic voter basis his/her vote out of self-interest, recent analysis by Kiewiet and 
Lewis-Beck (2011) has argued that sociotropic voters act out of self interest.  
  
27 
 
 A central tenant of CEVT is the even-handed approach of punishment and reward. 
The fact that voters reward and punish “even-handedly” has erroneously been interpreted 
by the literature as evidence of voter symmetry. When voters punish the incumbent for 
economic downturns and reward it for periods of economic prosperity, voters may be 
engaging in reward and punishment “even-handedly”, but an even-handed approach 
doesn’t necessarily translate into a symmetric action of punishment and reward. In fact, 
voters may act in an even-handed manner, but the magnitude of punishment may be 
greater than the magnitude of reward. In other words, voters may punish more for bad 
economic times than they reward for a flourishing economy.  
 Unfortunately, the magnitude of the relationship between punishment and reward 
has seldom been tested. In cases in which the asymmetry of the vote was assessed, the 
asymmetry of the vote was defined in a conservative manner. The asymmetry of the vote 
implied that voters punished the incumbent during economic downturns but failed to 
reward the incumbent during economic upswings. Such an interpretation of the 
asymmetry of the vote fails to consider instances where both punishment and reward may 
be present, but with differing magnitudes. Relaxing the definition of the asymmetry of 
the vote, this thesis associates the concept with the latter definition. 
 In order to empirically assess whether the asymmetry of voting exists in the 
developing context, we need to first have a theoretical structure from which we can 
associate possible asymmetric effects. Looking at rational choice theory, it becomes 
evident that the theoretical framework is ill-equipped at explaining asymmetric behavior. 
In fact, choice theory assumes that the cost of obtaining an item should be similar to the 
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cost of giving it up. Here we see that choice theory interprets an action in a symmetrical 
manner. Choice theory also assumes risk-neutrality in decision-making.   
 In behavioral economics, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) work critiqued 
expected utility theory of the rational choice model for its inability to properly account 
for decision-making within the realm of certainty and uncertainty. The expected utility 
model stated that preference order lacks change within different probability models. That 
is, when preference A is preferred to B, the change in the probability mixture of 
preference A would not change its success rate. Kahneman and Tversky disputed the 
claim by demonstrating that decision-making changes under conditions of certainty and 
uncertainty. When faced with certainty, individual decision-making becomes more risk 
averse. However, when faced with uncertainty individual decision-making becomes more 
risk seeking (Kahneman and Tversky, 266).  
Additionally, Kahnemann and Tversky demonstrated that decision-making was 
asymmetrical as opposed to symmetrical, with individuals placing emphasis on loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In other words, 
the negative impact of losses exceeded the positive impact of gains. The loss-aversion 
assumption (also referred to as the cost-orientation hypothesis) notes that individuals 
place more emphasis on avoidance of costs than approachment to gains (Soroka 2006, 
373). For Kahnemann and Tversky, when individuals operate within a domain of gains, 
decision-making becomes more risk-averse. In contrast, decision-making in a domain of 
losses become more risk-seeking
9
.  
                                                 
9
 Rational choice presumes risk aversion independent of the reference point (the reference point being 
whether an individual is operating under the domain of gains and losses). Prospect theory diverges from 
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The application of prospect theory in comparative political economy of the 
developing world was applied by Kurt Weyland’s (1996) work on the theoretical 
behavioral determinants of Latin American presidents during the region’s 
experimentation with neoliberal economics
10
. Weyland attempted to understand why 
elected leaders enacted shock therapy policies given the fact that such policies risked 
their political careers. In comparing choice theory with prospect theory, Weyland noted 
that the latter provided a more concrete explanation of elite policy proposals. According 
to choice theory, presidents such as Carlos Menem (of Argentina), Fernando Collor (of 
Brazil), Alberto Fujimori (of Peru) and Carlos Perez (of Venezuela) would refrain from 
enacting neoliberal policies due to fear of political backlash. However, despite the 
volatile political and economic climate, and contrary to choice theory, all four leaders 
went ahead with shock therapy of their respective countries’ economy. According to 
Weyland, Prospect theory provided a more accurate theoretical explanation as to the 
behavioral traits of Latin American presidents. In facing a domain of losses during the 
debt crisis, the executives became risk-seeking (thus instituting shock therapy instead of a 
gradual economic policy).  
  While Weyland’s work concentrated on the analysis of Latin American leaders 
and voters, the majority of the work was dedicated to the actions of various elites. 
                                                                                                                                                 
this assumption by noting that the reference point determines individual behavior. When a individual is 
operating under a domain of gains he or she will be risk averse, but when under a domain of losses he or 
she will become risk seeking. (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988). 
10
 Biglaiser and DeRouen (2004) expanded on Weyland’s application of prospect theory in Latin American 
by empirically testing for the determinants of the deepening of neoliberal reforms in the face of growing 
economic disparity. Their model negated both institutional and political explanations and concluded that 
economic factors, the inflation rate, was a determinant of whether one continues down the shock therapy 
path of neoliberal reforms. The authors incorporated prospect theory by noting that when faced with a 
domain of losses (e.g. higher inflation), Latin American leaders would engage in risk-seeking (continue 
with neoliberal reforms). 
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Weyland’s critique of rational choice theory as a theoretical understanding of Latin 
American elites and voters can also be applied within the context of economic voting. 
Historically, economic voting has relied on choice theory to further it claims on the 
behavioral traits of voters. Initial reliance on choice theory proved unsuccessful with 
egotropic voting failing to resonate with the U.S. electorate. As early works of economic 
voting realized the inability of egotropic perceptions to account for voting behavior, 
scholars revised assumptions of economic voting to demonstrate that sociotropic voting 
too was a rationally-oriented decision.  
Prospect theory potentially offers more coherent explanation of economic voting 
than its counterpart. Using rational choice theory as an underlying theoretical framework 
of economic voting would assume that voters not only maximize absolute utility but are 
also risk-neutral regardless of a reference point. However, in developing countries when 
voters punish the incumbent under bad economic times and vote for the hypothetical 
economic policies of the opposition, they are essentially engaging in risk-seeking 
behavior, in that the hypothetical economic policies are of greater risk than the known 
policies of the incumbent
11
. Thus, economic voter behavior under an economic downturn 
exemplifies risk-seeking behavior. The rational choice situation that minimizes risk 
                                                 
11
 Given the infancy and volatility of the party system in the developing world, it is not uncommon to see 
opposition candidates revert back from their electoral platform and enact policies that staunchly differ from 
their campaign promises. Notable examples include President Alberto Fujimori of Peru and President Luiz 
da Siva of Brazil. Fujimori’s presidential candidacy promised to scale back on neoliberal reforms. 
However, upon ascending to the presidency, Fujimori not only reneged on his campaign promises but 
further implemented neoliberal reforms. In Brazil, candidate de Silva emphasized the fight against poverty 
and highlighted that the poverty-stricken poor would be given top priority in his administration (Smith, 
2005). However, as president, de Silva’s administration pushed for greater foreign investment in Brazil, 
advanced Brazil’s role in the BRICS, and rejuvenated the domestic capital structure in Brazil. His 
campaign promise of eradicating the favelas was simply abandoned in favor of state-led economic 
development. Thus, due to the volatile party systems in the developing world (which tend to be candidate-
centered and lack a durable party platform) voting for the opposition’s hypothetical economic policies is 
the riskier approach. 
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would be to stick with the known policies of the incumbent, rather than risk the 
implementation of the unknown policies of the opposition. This parallels Weyland’s 
account of the behavior traits of Latin American presidents. The rational choice model 
noted that elites would stay the course of gradual development, while the prospect theory-
oriented model noted that elites would institute shock therapy, despite negative voter 
reaction. Thus, by not staying the course with the incumbent and instead punishing him 
or her in favor of the hypothetical and more risky policies of the opposition, voter 
behavior traits within a domain of losses is evidenced by risk-seeking.   
Prospect theory is also better apt at describing the magnitude of asymmetry in 
reward-punishment mechanism of valence economic voting. Through the cost-oriented 
assumption, prospect theory assumes that greater weight on decision-making is placed 
when voters operate within a domain of losses than in the domain of gains. This 
essentially provides the theoretical backdrop of inferring voting asymmetry. If, according 
to prospect theory, individuals place greater weight in domain of losses than they do on 
domain of gains then decision-making under the domain of losses outweighs decision-
making under the domain of gains. Paralleling domain of losses to economic downturns 
and domain of gain to economic upswings, I propose that the magnitude of economic 
voting is not only asymmetrical but demonstrates greater weight in bad economic times, 
as opposed to good ones. 
Prospect theory demonstrates not only a alternative account of the reward-
punishment mechanism, but also provides the theoretical structures to infer an 
asymmetric relationship between punishment and reward. If voters are found to behave in 
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asymmetric manners, then by default rational choice theory becomes ill-equipped at 
explaining voter asymmetry.  
Importing the cost-oriented assumption of economic voting to decision-making 
within a voting booth, I hypothesize that 
                                                                                             
                                                                                 
                                                         
In other words, voters will demonstrate a negativity bias when engaging in economic 
voting. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the tenants of CEVT have been strictly influenced by case studies 
involving developed countries. In outlining the theoretical constructs (the hypotheses) of 
CEVT, the chapter laid out the seven hypotheses that will be tested against a cross-
national pool of developing countries in order to understand whether the developed 
country-influenced CEVT is a proper starting-point for understanding economic voting in 
the developing world.  
In the second part of the chapter, I proposed a shift away from rational theory of 
choice as the underlying foundation of economic voter behavior, and a pivot towards 
prospect theory. Simply stated, rational theory of choice fails to account for the reference 
point within which voters operate. It erroneously presumes that economic voting within a 
risk-neutral mindset. Prospect theory provides a different starting point for assessing 
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economic voting. It assumes that decision-making is contingent upon a reference point. It 
also is apt with explaining potential asymmetrical patterns of economic voting behavior. 
Reliance on prospect theory as a revised starting-point for understanding the reward-
punishment mechanism provides an alternative understanding of dichotomous domains in 
which reward and punishment are distributed. Additionally, it also provides a theoretical 
reasoning for potential voter asymmetry.  
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 As previously mentioned, in the past couple of decades scholarly attention on 
economic voting has expanded to several hundred works. And while an overwhelming 
majority of the scholarship has focused on developed states, works on developing 
countries have been gradually growing. A comprehensive discussion of the voluminous 
scholarship in the field is beyond the scope of the research. Instead, the following chapter 
aims to provide a chronological timeline of the evolution of the research on economic 
voting by dividing the literature into three distinct, methodologically-oriented epochs, in 
order to gain a proper understanding of the transitional waves of economic voting 
scholarship. After a description of the three distinct epochs, the chapter will then address 
past research on the developing world by examining the following regions: Latin 
America, Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. Although the works on the 
developing world have increased in size, they still dwarf the ink that has been spilled on 
mature democracies. 
Methodological Infancy Stage (1920s - 1970)   
 The sociological discipline had an impact on the development of the relationship 
between economics and elections. Sociologists had attempted to find a correlation 
between the business cycle and specific social conditions. Influenced by William Ogburn 
and Dorothy Thomas’ (1922) work on the association between economics and social 
changes, Stuart Rice (1928) set out to assess whether economics (more specifically, the 
business cycle) had an impact on politics. Rice found that changes in the business cycle 
led to changes in the popularity of the Republican Party (Rice, 292). His analysis was 
limited to the state of New Jersey and the methodology was a simple correlation between 
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time series. Clark Tibbits (1931) replicated Rice’s theoretical approach at the national 
level with research on elections in the House of Representatives. Tibbits concerned 
himself with whether business conditions were associated with the popularity of political 
parties during election years. Using the Harvard curve of business activity (1875-1902), 
and limiting his analysis to nine “industrial” states12, Tibbits found a correlation between 
the prosperity of the business cycle and proportion of votes received by the incumbent 
party. This led Tibbits to conclude that “judging from these data, the party in power is 
justified in anticipating victory when an election follows a period of business expansion, 
and is rightly apprehensive when the election falls in a depression year” (Tibbits, 603). 
 Louis Bean’s (1940) Ballot Behavior expanded on the relationship between 
economics and elections. Bean demonstrated that since 1854 the incumbent party in 
Congress had lost membership seventy-nine percent of the time when a recession 
preceded elections. However, economics failed to have the expected impact on 
Congressional elections during presidential election years as economic distress actually 
resulted in the majority party gaining seats. Perhaps the most significant finding of 
Bean’s work was the asymmetric relationship between economics and elections. Bean 
concluded that while economic decline hurt the Democratic Party, economic prosperity (a 
rise in business) failed to bring the Democrats electoral reward. The economic voting 
asymmetry interpretation that was noted by Bean would go on to be neglected for another 
three decades until it would be rejuvenated in an extensive methodological manner by 
Mueller (1970), and Bloom and Price (1975). 
                                                 
12
 In order for Tibbits to “secure a homogeneity of election issues” he limited his study to nine industrial 
states with a sample size of ninty-four 
  
36 
 
 Lastly, in 1948 F.A. Pearson and W.I. Myers looked at the relationship between 
rising prices and presidential voting. For Pearson and Myers the decline of prices 
represented the decline of economic welfare in the citizenry, while rising prices brought 
economic prosperity. Interestingly, authors interpreted the period 1896 to 1928 as one 
where the rise of prices brought economic prosperity. The authors observed periods of 
inflation as the result of growth, thus assigning a positive association between inflation 
and presidential success at the polls. Using the level of prices and party identification of 
the presidency, Pearson and Myers concluded that high prices were correlated with 
Republican control of the White House between 1896 and 1928. Following the Great 
Depression, the reign of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman were marked by high 
prices. This led Pearson and Myers to conclude that low prices hurt incumbent presidents 
while high prices helped them. 
 The theoretical pillars of economic voting began to coalesce with three particular 
works: Campbell et al.’s The American Voter (1960), Anthony Downs’ An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (1956) and V.O Key’s Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 
(1942) and The Responsible Electorate (1966). Campbell et al.’s work provided 
exceptional theoretical pillars to the study of economic voting. Above all, Campbell et al 
initiated the distinction between what today is referred to as pocketbook and sociotropic 
economic evaluations. Although limited to the 1956 election, one of the major takeaways 
from the book was that those who evaluated the economy through optimistic lenses were 
more likely to vote for the incumbent. Despite providing evidence of economic voting, 
the book largely attributed the economic vote to political attitudes: “Partisanship drove 
both groups of Democrats (those not hurt as well as those hurt) to criticism and pushed 
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both groups of Republicans (those not hurt as well as those hurt) into positions of support 
(Campbell et al., 1960:389). While the authors strengthened the pillars of economic 
voting theory, they also refined the theory by noting that the economic vote was simply a 
reflection of partisan identification. The “endogeneity” issue would continue to be 
neglected until the third methodological stage
13
.  
 Anthony Downs’ (1956) work on the theoretical assumptions of the rational voter 
provided further description on the notion of retrospective and prospective voting. 
Downs’ theory became the foundations of prospective economic voting. In fact, in 
Fiorina’s seminal work on economic voting, the author referred to Downs as the theorist 
behind the idea of prospective voting. What Downs was to prospective economic voting, 
Key was to retrospective economic voting. Of the three theoretical pioneers, Key 
provided the lengthiest description of the pillars of economic voting, including, the 
rationality behind economic voting, retrospective economic voting, the notion of 
reward/punishment mechanism and the incumbent-oriented hypothesis. 
 The scholarship on economic voting during the infancy period lacked a rigorous 
methodological foundation, due to the fact that advanced econometric tools were not 
widely available. While Tibbits relied on cross-sectional data, Bean and Pearson and 
Myers favored longitudinal data. Their works lacked sophisticated econometric tools 
aimed at assessing the role of economics in electoral decision-making. What the infancy 
staged lacked methodologically, it made up for it theoretically. The works of Campbell et 
al., Downs and Key provided the necessary description for various theoretical constructs 
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 The issue of endogeneity in economic voting stems from the fact that voter perceptions about the 
economy is simply a result of their political identification. In this sense the causality arrow is from political 
attribution to economic perceptions.   
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to take-off. Despite progression in theory, literature on economic voting lacked a sizable 
attention. It wasn’t until the “behavioral revolution” that research on economic voting 
began to expand.  
Methodological Innovation Stage (1970 – 1986)       
 The behavioral revolution, which in the late 1960s began importing econometric 
modeling from economics, made its way to economic voting with three pioneering works. 
Goodhart and Bhansali’s (1970) study on the popularity of British political parties and 
party leaders brought forth the relevance of economic indicators as factors influencing the 
popularity of political parties and leaders. Using various statistical techniques, Goodhart 
and Bhansali were able to demonstrate that political popularity is dependent upon such 
economic indicators as inflation and unemployment.  Furthermore, the authors were able 
to establish that the conservative Torrey Party was more sensitive to changes in economic 
conditions than the liberal Labour Party.  
John Mueller’s (1970) work addressed the popularity of U.S presidents in the 
post-1945 era. Relying on Gallup polling and multiple regression analysis, Mueller tested 
the popularity of an incumbent president on several explanatory variables, including 
coalition of minorities effect, rally around the flag effect, economic slump and the war 
effect. Mueller operationalized economic slump with the unemployment rate. 
Specifically, he subtracted the effects of the unemployment rate at the beginning of the 
incumbent’s term from the unemployment rate at the time the poll was taken to create a 
unique unemployment indicator. With regard to economic voting, Mueller found that for 
each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate from the time the incumbent 
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took office, presidential popularity decreased about three percentage points (Mueller, 28). 
That said, when the unemployment rate increased, the popularity of the president failed to 
positively correspond to the increase. Thus, in the case of economic voting, Mueller 
concluded that voters punished but failed to reward
14
.  
The third (and most cited) pioneering work that set the stage for a plethora of 
economic voting literature was Gerald Kramer’s (1971) study on Congressional voting 
behavior in the United States. Kramer critiqued past economic voting literature for its 
simplistic statistical modeling (Kramer, 133). Kramer instituted a macro-level 
multivariate analysis of congressional voting based on various economic indicators. The 
findings suggested that a ten percent decrease in real income per capita cost the 
incumbent party between four to five percentage points of the vote.   
 Kramer’s substantive findings resulted in both a successful replication (e.g. Fair, 
1973) and negation (e.g. Stigler, 1973) of his methodology. George Stigler critiqued 
Kramer’s work for its omission of periods of war in his model and Kramer’s inability to 
address problematic multicollinearity. Stigler pointed out that once omitted years were 
included in the study, the model was no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, 
Stigler demonstrated that different forms of measurement of economic indicators 
(absolute versus percentage change) resulted in different results. The association between 
the economy and the incumbent party led scholars to question whether the incumbent 
party could control economic indicators prior to elections for its economic benefit? 
Arcelus and Meltzer’s (1975) findings negated the idea that incumbent presidents helped 
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 Methodologically Mueller’s work was refuted by Hibbs  (1973) who demonstrated that Mueller’s case 
suffered from serial autocorrelation. Thus, the so-called economic slump effect “is a spurious artifact of 
autocorrelation” (Hibbs Jr., 288). After controlling for autocorrelation Mueller’s economic slump indicator 
and argument is refuted. 
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their party ticket increase support for in-party candidates by reducing unemployment or 
increasing growth of real income.  
  These three pioneering works became the backdrop for future economic voting 
research. In fact, the so-called voter-popularity, or VP function gained its framework 
from the three studies. The VP function, as theorized by Martin Paldam (1981), derived 
its acronym from the vote function and the popularity function. According to Paldam, the 
vote function is a function that explains election results, while a popularity function is a 
function that explains the results of a popularity poll. Given the fact that the two 
functions are closely related, Paldam termed them the “VP function” for essentially 
explaining short-run dynamics of the economy. The three works also differentiated in 
terms of the methodological analysis used. While Goodhard and Bhansali (1970) and 
Mueller (1970) relied on micro-level survey analysis, Kramer’s work (1971) resorted 
towards aggregate level voter and economic analysis. The different methodological 
approaches created a much needed debate as to what was the proper level of 
measurement of economic voting. 
 Initial scholarship sided with Kramer as works began to rely on aggregate-level 
indicators. In 1978, Morris Fiorina attempted to use microlevel analysis to demonstrate 
economic voting in both Congressional and Presidential elections. Using the Michigan 
Survey Research Center (SRC) Survey, Fiorina overall found little support for 
retrospective voting in the United States. While Presidential elections demonstrated some 
evidence of economic retrospective voting, inquiry in congressional elections and 
congressional midterms found little or no support for economic retrospective voting. 
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Despite Fiorina’s mediocre results, his work shifted the methodological tide towards 
micro-level economic voting.  
Klorman’s (1978) work expanded micro-level analysis towards pocketbook and 
sociotropic evaluations. Theoretically, homo-economicus is a person whose sole concern 
is the maximization of his or her utility curve. Furthermore, since information is costly, 
voters are assumed to be pocketbook-oriented, since pocketbook voting required minimal 
political and economic expertise. As such, it was probable to suspect that the rational 
voter was a pocketbook voter. Such was the underlying theoretical assumption prior to 
empirical tests of the pocketbook voter. Using data from the CPS/SRC national election 
studies (1956-1974), Klorman demonstrated that personal finances (pocketbook) had a 
negligible effect on the vote
15.  Kinder and Kiewiet’s (1979; 1981) works further 
deepened scholarship towards the dismissal of pocketbook voting, and demonstrated that 
contrary to the theoretical assumption, voters were sociotropic voters (but see: Kuklinski 
and West, 1981).  
Despite the not so promising results of microlevel analysis, survey-oriented 
research progressed with sociotropic voting. The question that arose from the wave of 
micro-level research was why, contrary to theoretical assumptions, pocketbook voting 
lacked in U.S. economic voting literature. Several scholars (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; 
Lewis-Beck, 1983) noted that the lack of pocketbook voting in the American polity was 
due to the individualist nature of the American “culture”. The presence of a strong sense 
of individualism within American voters leads the electorate to place blame within 
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 In the elections of 1964, 1966 and 1974, Klorman demonstrates that those whose financial situation 
worsened either matched the incumbent support of those whose situation had improved, or exceeded them. 
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themselves, instead of the incumbent party, for their personal economic misfortune. This 
self-blame attitude leads the American electorate to forego the connection between 
personal economic grievances and the incumbent government. 
The second methodological stage also included works attempting to understand 
the asymmetrical relationship between economics and the vote
16
. Bloom and Price’s 
(1973) work reinterpreted the notion of asymmetry of voting to include cases where both 
punishment and reward were present, though the magnitude was asymmetric
17
. 
Regressing the percentage change in real per capita income in the year preceding the 
election on the Republican share of the vote in the House of Representatives, Bloom and 
Price noted that while voters punished incumbent parties for economic downturns, 
economic prosperity failed to produce voter reward. Bloom and Price’s conclusion of 
punishment but no reward sparked a theoretical and methodological debate with regard to 
asymmetry of the vote. The theoretical assumption within the asymmetry of the vote 
revolved around the saliency of the economy. It was noted that the economy mattered 
more during times of crisis. As such, based on the time periods when the economy would 
become salient, punishment would outweigh reward. 
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 The asymmetry of voting derives its theoretical structure from the school of social psychology. 
Nehemiah Jordan’s (1965) review of literature on the asymmetry of positive and negative events noted that 
within the individual thought process, existed an asymmetrical scale between positive and negative events. 
Feldman’s (1966) research on the asymmetry of individual description found that negative adjectives 
outweigh positive adjectives. By 1970, scholarship in social psychology had established the presence of a 
“negativity bias” in various events and characterizations (Kanouse and Hanson Jr., 1972). John Mueller’s 
(1970; 1973) work on presidential popularity and asymmetrical evaluations was the first quantitatively-
oriented work on presidential popularity and evaluation asymmetry. Mueller attempted to identify the 
determinants of presidential popularity, using among others, an economic slump indicator. Mueller 
operationalized it as the rate of unemployment. The results suggested that while a sluggish economy 
harmed presidential popularity, an improving economy failed to boost the president’s ratings. The verdict 
was clear: voters dished out punishment during an economic regression but failed to reward the president 
during periods of economic prosperity. 
17
 Mueller’s analysis of the asymmetry of voting demonstrated a case where there was punishment but no 
reward. Bloom and Price expanded the scope of the concept to include instances where both punishment 
and reward exist, but the degree of punishment outweighs reward 
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Samuel Kernell’s (1977) thesis on negative voting critiqued the “surge and 
decline” model for its inability to resonate with the data on election turnout. Kernell 
applied an alternative theoretical approach towards modeling midterm elections. The 
notion of negative voting assumed that voters voted against something, not for it 
(Kernell, 51). Testing a set of four hypotheses on the idea that negativity reinforces voter 
behavior, Kernell demonstrated disapproval of the president resulted in greater tendency 
to act than approval. In all, Kernell concluded that the effects of presidential approval and 
disapproval were asymmetric.  
Steven Rosenstone (1982) expanded the theoretical foundation of asymmetry of 
voting by describing three forms of response during economic adversity. Economic 
adversity either produced mobilization, withdrawal, or no effect. The mobilization 
perspective noted that economic adversity led voters to mobilize thus dishing out 
punishment in greater numbers. On the other hand, withdrawal signaled a reduction in 
voter capacity to participate in elections during economic adversity. The withdrawal 
syndrome was a clear negation of the so-called “grievance asymmetry hypothesis” and 
corresponded with a positive bias of voting (as in reward but no punishment). Rosenstone 
found that voters in 1974 exhibited the withdrawal syndrome. In other words, contrary to 
Mueller’s, Bloom and Price’s, and even Kernell’s findings, Rosenstone concluded that 
voters who were worse off financially were less likely to vote. 
By the end of the 1970s, the economic voting disciple began witnessing its first 
methodological debate between applications of macro-level versus micro-level analyses. 
Kramer’s (1983) critique of micro-level analysis provided the necessary evidence as to 
why the majority of scholarship on economic voting was oriented towards macro-level 
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analysis. Kramer suggested that micro-level studies were inherently unstable (e.g. 
Fiorina, 1978) and suffered from measurement error and response bias. Furthermore, 
subjective assessment of macroeconomic conditions based on retrospective judgments 
was “either partisan rationalization or perpetual noise” (Conover et al., 1986). Thus, 
individual-level analysis lacked the proper methodological mechanisms to propose stable 
inferences. Kramer’s critique of micro-level analysis was countered by Kiewiet and 
Rivers (1984) critique of the use of aggregate methodology. Kiewiet and Rivers noted 
that macro-level methodology suffered from either a short time series or “the data extend 
over a period of time so long that the stability of the regression function becomes 
questionable” (Kiewiet and Rivers, 372). 
 The methodological debate provided an unprecedented wave of scholarship on 
economic voting. Despite the growth of the research program, scholarship within the 
second methodological stage solely addressed economic voting in advanced industrial 
societies. While the overwhelming majority of initial studies were aimed towards the 
United States and Britain, by the 1980s studies on France (e.g. Lewis-Beck, 1980; Hibbs 
Jr. and Vasilatos, 1981; Lewis-Beck and Bellucci, 1982; Lewis-Beck, 1983; Lafay, 
1984), Italy (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Bellucci, 1982), and Japan (e.g. Reed and Brunk, 1984) 
began appearing. The widening of the scope of cases led to the ability to deviate from 
single-country studies and perform cross-national observations. 
Methodological Progression Stage (1986 – Current) 
 By the end of the 1980s the state of the scholarship on economic voting was 
“methodologically troubling” (Powell Jr. 1987, 256). At issue was the inconsistency 
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between macro and micro-level findings
18
, the inability of social scientists to fuse the two 
methods, issues of endogeneity in micro-level models, and instability of economic 
coefficients across time. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the works had been 
single case studies concentrating on the Western world. The third methodological stage, 
though unable to solve the micro-macro divide, expanded the scope of study by 
attempting cross-national studies of economic voting. The results demonstrated the 
inconsistency of economic voting across time and nations. 
 Lewis-Beck’s (1986) comparative study of economic voting in Europe set the 
stage for cross-national works. Using the Eurobarometer survey, Lewis-Beck 
demonstrated that while economic voting was present in Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy, the degree of strength differed substantially between countries. While Britain 
displayed the strongest degree of economic voting, Italy had the lowest. Although Lewis-
Beck’s cross-sectional study was a snapshot of the influence of economics, the questions 
asked by him set the stage for an explanation as to why the degree of economic voting 
differed country by country. Paldam’s (1991) cross-national study on seventeen mature 
democracies further cast criticism on the instability of the VP function across countries 
and time periods. Concluding that only a handful of countries and time periods 
demonstrated economic voting, Paldam’s work casted a doubt on the universality of 
CEVT and rejuvenated the theoretical debate of economic voting.   
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 Kramer’s critique of micro-level modeling also steamed from the fact that such an approach tended to be 
(1) cross-sectional, thus unwilling to be generalizable across time and (2) the subjective nature of the 
sociotropic variable which led it to be influenced by exogenous variables. Gregory Markus (1988; 1992) 
addressed the “Kramer issue” by including national economic evaluations within individual-level vote 
functions and using a pooled cross sectional data. 
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 The increased inconsistency of cross-national studies led Powell and Whitten 
(1993) to coin the concept “clarity of responsibility.” Building on the notion that cross-
national analyses of economic voting were plagued by inconsistent results, Powell and 
Whitten suggested that the instable resulting across countries was due to the differing 
electoral context. Thus, the linkage of voter punishment or reward with the incumbent 
government was mediated by the electoral context. “The greater the perceived unified 
control of policymaking by incumbent government, the more likely is a citizen to assign 
responsibility” (Powell and Whitten, 398). The authors noted that a bicameral opposition, 
minority government and a coalition government were all variables that negatively 
affected the clarity of responsibility and thus blurred the relationship between economics 
and incumbent responsibility. Creating an index of clarity of responsibility, the authors 
divided countries between high clarity of responsibility and low clarity of responsibility. 
Subsequent research proved the vital aspect of clarity of responsibility (Whitten and 
Palmer, 1999). Powell and Whitten’s theoretical framework, while providing a new 
avenue of economic voting, assumed that voters were knowledgeable and thus could 
properly identify whether a party was part of a coalition and more importantly the 
assignment of committee chairmanships in parliament (Tucker, 2001). Although critiques 
of Powell and Whitten’s hypothesis has casted doubt on the significance of the political 
context (Royed et al., 2000; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; but see Palmer and Whitten, 
2003), the central theorem of the mediating relationship between economics and the vote 
has gathered general consensus. 
With regard to the asymmetry of the vote, the third methodological stage 
continued to quantitatively assess whether the asymmetrical results of Bloom and Price 
  
47 
 
could be replicated and broadened in different contexts. Clagget’s (1986) work furthered 
the proposition of negative bias by successfully replicating Bloom and Price’s hypothesis 
by widening the scope of observation from 1872-1982. However, a study on the British 
electorate negated Bloom and Price’s notion of economic voting asymmetry (Headrick 
and Lanoue, 1991). Additionally, Kernell’s thesis was also subject to replication. While 
critics centered on methodological issues (e.g. Gant and Davis, 1984; Born, 1990),   
proponents successfully replicated (e.g. Lau, 1982; 1985) and revised (Fiorina and 
Shepsle, 1989) Kernell’s notion of “negative voting.” Importing Rosenstone’s theoretical 
framework, Radcliff (1992) found a distinction between voter reaction in developed and 
developing countries. While the former exhibited withdrawal symptoms, the latter 
demonstrated symptoms of mobilization. Thus, one would assume the notion of 
grievance asymmetry to be evident in the developing country studies (Indeed, in a later 
work by Pacek and Radcliff (1995), the authors found that exact mobilization effect in 
the developing world)
19
.  
Since the inception of the four pioneering works on the asymmetry of voting, 
scholarship has lacked a definitive account of whether voters behave in asymmetric 
fashion and whether such behavior is predominantly negative and rooted in economic 
perceptions. Lewis-Beck’s Economics and Elections (1988) debunked the grievance 
asymmetry hypothesis by demonstrating its absence at the microlevel. In fact, from 
Lewis-Beck’s output one could infer that voters may actually be positive biased. Further 
proof of positive bias was provided by Radcliff (1994) in US presidential elections. 
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 Mobilization of  the electorate during economic downturns in the developing world was also noted by 
Aguilar and Pacek (2000) who found that a declining economy increases voter turnout for working-
class/economically disadvantaged (WCED) parties. 
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While both Lewis-Beck and Radcliff critiqued the application of grievance asymmetry, 
Nannestad and Paldam (1997) work on grievance asymmetry within the Danish 
electorate
20
 rejuvenated the hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, grievance asymmetry has not been prone to the level of scholarly 
attention since Nannestad and Paldam’s work. Despite a call on further research by 
scholars of economic voting (Nezi, 2012), the subject matter has largely been neglected. 
This is an unsettling manner, given the fact that prior literature has been unable to 
quintessentially establish a general consensus on the presence of asymmetric voting and 
the conditions that mediate it. Scholarship has presented the theoretical grounds for 
grievance asymmetry. If the economy matters only when it is salient (Singer, 2011; 
Singer, 2013), or during times of economic volatility, then economic voting will be more 
prominent during recessionary periods. As such, there will be greater magnitude of 
punishment than reward. 
The third methodological stage also brought forth a wave of CEVT critiques. 
Although works which critiqued the application of CEVT had existed in the past (e.g. 
Norpoth and Yantek, 1983), their scope was limited to producing null results. In the third 
methodological wave, critiques of CEVT appeared both theoretically and 
methodologically. Theoretically, scholarship critiqued the reductionist view of the theory 
due to the fact that CEVT had taken on a retrospective-oriented application and neglected 
the possibility of asymmetry of the vote (Wilkin et al., 1997). Methodologically, criticism 
was aimed at CEVT for the fact that economic evaluations were marked by subjective 
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 Interestingly, the Danish electorate may be the ultimate outlier of economic voting. It has consistently 
demonstrated a pocketbook-oriented approach, contrary to an overwhelming amount of literature proving 
the superiority of sociotropic evaluations. Additionally, the fact that the Danish electorate exhibited 
patterns of grievance asymmetry only increases the marginalization of economic voting in Denmark. 
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(instead of objective) factors, which produced systematic variations across cases (Duch et 
al., 2000), and the causal chain of events economic voting presumed (Evans and 
Andersen, 2006; Evans and Pickup, 2010; Palmer and Whitten, 2011). The latter 
criticized CEVT for its presumption that economic evaluations caused political 
evaluations.  Observing the British electorate, Evans and Andersen found that sociotropic 
economic evaluations were influenced by partisan identification. Furthermore, party ID 
systematically influenced economic perceptions (But see: Lewis-Beck, 2006).   
 The overwhelming evidence of economic voting in mature democracies led 
scholars to draw parallels with countries in the developing world. Pacek and Radcliff 
(1995) set out to apply Kramer’s methodology to eight developing countries. Despite a 
sample size of only fifty-two elections, Pacek and Radcliff found that economic voting in 
the developing world failed to fit the classic reward-punishment model, evident in mature 
democracies. Specifically, voters punished the incumbent for economic downturns but 
failed to reward them during prosperous economic times. The results forced Pacek and 
Radcliff to conclude that the notion of grievance asymmetry was indeed an issue with 
developing countries. Anderson et al. (2003) used a micro-level approach to model 
economic perceptions on political support. Critiquing the use of “western” survey 
research models, the authors negated the use of party identification, ideology, social and 
cultural issues, by simply testing economic evaluations with the inclusion of a 
“satisfaction with revolution” indicator. Basing the study off of the 1990 Nicaraguan 
presidential elections and the 1994 Hungarian parliamentary elections, they concluded 
that voters in both countries exhibited both retrospective and prospective evaluations, but 
that the former explained a larger percentage of the vote than the latter. Gelineau’s (2013) 
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comprehensive study of economic voting at the micro-level incorporated all the 
“barometer” datasets in order to assess the degree of economic perceptions on 
presidential popularity. The author concluded that “in the vast majority of cases, it 
appears that economic assessments are directly linked to incumbent support” (Gelineau, 
421).    
 The Great Recession rejuvenated scholarship on economic voting with empirical 
tests once again concentrating on mature democracies, despite the fact that developing 
countries faced the brunt of the crisis. Anderson and Hecht (2012) used the German 2009 
legislative election to assess the role of the economy on the vote during the economic 
crisis. Ironically, the authors found that the global economic turmoil produced limited 
effects of economic voting in Germany. The authors concluded that this was due to the 
fact that the German electorate assessed the crisis as an exogenous shock and thus failed 
to blame the incumbent coalition government. Freire and Santana-Pereira (2012) found 
similar results with 2009 Portuguese elections, one in which the role of the economy 
failed to get prominence due to the exogenous nature of the crisis. Nezi (2012) observed  
economic voting in Greece and found a relationship between retrospective, sociotropic 
perceptions and the vote for the incumbent. Martinsson’s observation of economic voting 
in Sweden found that amidst the global recession, “no significant punishment” was 
dished out by Swedish voters (Martinsson, 474). Ultimately, the wave of scholarship that 
followed the great recession proved the instability of economic voting. While in some 
areas economics heightened the impact on the vote, in other areas it did not. 
 The theoretical and methodological application of valence economic voting is 
largely settled in developed countries. Recent works in mature democracies has either 
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ventured into patrimonial and positional economic voting or have attempted to gain a 
“complete” understanding of economic voting by empirically assessing the relationship 
within a valence, patrimonial and positional theoretical setting (e.g. Nadeau et al., 2011; 
Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012; Lewis-Beck et al., 2012, Clarke and Whitten, 2013; 
Fraile and Lewis-Beck, 2013). The “methodological progression stage” expanded 
scholarly attention towards developing countries. Despite an increased share of research, 
scholarship on developing countries lacks a proper non-western theoretical framework, a 
proper methodological approach and a historical assessment of the applicability of 
economic voting in certain electoral settings. Through a review of the literature on 
economic voting in the developing world, I will demonstrate why the western theoretical 
framework of the economic voter (as envisioned by CEVT) is not necessarily applicable 
to the developing country context. 
Economic Voting in Developing Countries 
 Scholarship on developing countries has dwarfed its developed-country 
counterpart. Although recent research has picked up in the developing world, it is by no 
means equally distributed across regions. The overwhelming majority of the works have 
concentrated on Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe, with only a fraction of 
works addressing economic voting in Africa and Asia. The common excuse has much to 
do with data availability, both in macro and micro terms. While the scarcity of 
macroeconomic data can be a warranted excuse, surveys such as the Afrobarometer and 
the Asianbarometer have provided the necessary tools to properly understand the 
economic voter. 
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 Latin America 
Historically single country case studies have dominated scholarship in Latin 
America with Peru being the most abundant country study. The skewness of research 
towards Peru is due to the fact that the country provides academics with an opportunity to 
test the effect of political violence in economic voting models. The consistent 
implementation of neoliberal programs by subsequent presidents, combined with the 
political threat presented by the “shining path” has resulted in a bundle of scholarship 
aimed at understanding the predictors of presidential popularity (e.g. Stokes, 1996; 
Weyland, 2000; Kelly, 2003; Arce, 2003). Research on economic voting in Peru has 
predominately taken a micro-level methodological approach due to the specific interests 
in the relationship between economics, political violence and presidential popularity. The 
results however have lacked a consistent economic determinant of the vote. Stokes 
(1996) found that higher inflation decreased support for both neoliberal reform and 
President Fujimori, while higher unemployment actually increased support for the 
incumbent (Stokes, 559-561). Weyland (2000) concluded that the growth rate had a 
significant effect on the popularity of the incumbent. Perhaps more important is the fact 
that political violence lacked statistical significance on presidential popularity. Kelly 
(2003) found that Peruvians were prospective voters who failed to associate GDP and 
inflation with presidential popularity, Arce (2003) concluded that higher inflation and 
unemployment decreased presidential popularity.  
Similar to Peru, economic voting literature in Venezuela also has concentrated on 
the popularity of the executive (e.g. Weyland, 1998; Weyland, 2003; Nadeau et al., 
2013). Weyland’s (1998) application of the peasant and banker analogy (See: MacKuen 
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et al., 1992) in Venezuela demonstrated that during the tenure of President Perez, 
Venezuelans were prospective and pocketbook voters. Upon the ascendance of power by 
Hugo Chavez, Weyland’s (2003) follow-up piece concluded that while voters maintained 
the prospective orientation, though they now assumed a sociotropic characteristic. 
Perhaps more important was Weyland’s critique of CEVT for failing to account for 
psychological processes of the electorate. Weyland demonstrated that economic 
discontent created an atmosphere of electoral withdrawal, resulted in those unhappy with 
the economy to refrain from voting (See: Radcliff, 1994). Weyland’s prospective 
Venezuelan economic voter was challenged by Nadeau et al. (2013) findings which 
concluded that once accounting for party identification and other long-term factors, 
voters demonstrated a retrospective orientation. Contrary to the Michigan model, the 
authors concluded that voter support for Chavez relied more on short-term factors than 
long-term factors. 
Economic voting in Mexico provides an interesting case study due to the 
longevity of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
21
. Brophy-Baermann (1994) 
study on the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and the vote for leftist 
opposition parties found that voters in Mexico are policy-oriented, rather than 
incumbency-oriented. Brophy-Baermann concludes that “what we see in Mexico is not a 
simple case of punishing the incumbent by voting for the out parties. Rather, we see that 
anti-incumbent voting has a heavy policy component in favor of the left” (Brophy-
Baermann, 132). Buendia’s (1996) work reached a different conclusion by noting that 
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 The PRI held power in Mexico since 1929 and until 2000 when the ascendance of National Action 
Party’s (PAN) Vincente Fox marked the first time in seventy-one years that political power in Mexico that 
PRI descended from the role of government  
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Mexican voters resemble the classic reward-punishment mechanism of CEVT. 
Regressing economic indicators on presidential approval, Buendia found that when 
inflation and unemployment rose, voters were less likely to support the incumbent, 
President Salinas. In terms of subjective economic evaluations, Dominguez and McCann 
(1995) concluded that voters in the 1988 election demonstrated prospective and 
pocketbook economic perceptions. Germano’s (2013) work has demonstrated that 
economic voting in conditioned upon remittance. In other words, those who receive 
remittances are less likely to hold the incumbent responsible and engage in economic 
voting.   
As shown above, single country studies in Latin America have generally focused 
only on Peru, Venezuela and Mexico. Recent scholarship has expanded towards 
modeling the relationship in Argentina (e.g. Canton and Jorrat, 2002; Remmer and 
Gelineau, 2003), and demonstrated a sociotropic, retrospective nature of economic 
evaluations (Canton and Jorrat, 2002). Of the works, a clear majority demonstrates that 
scholarship has relied on a micro-level interpretation of economic voting. In terms of the 
determinants of the economic vote, inflation seems to be a prominent variable. This is not 
surprising given the hyperinflationary period that dominated most of Latin American 
countries in the 1980s. In the area of subjective economic perceptions, scholarship finds 
that, surprisingly, voters tend to assume a prospective characteristic. This is quite 
different from the retrospective-dominated perceptions evident in advanced democracies 
(see Appendix A). 
Cross-national studies of Latin America are scarce in economic voting literature. 
Until recently, Remmer’s (1991) seminal work was the sole study. Remmer’s study 
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demonstrated that contrary to past literature, new democracies were not more vulnerable 
to economic crisis. Instead, “the relationship between economic conditions and aggregate 
electoral results was mediated principally by party system structure” (Remmer, 794). 
Using a cross-nation sample of twenty-one presidential elections from twelve Latin 
American countries, Remmer concluded that inflation and a depreciating exchange rate 
decreased support for the incumbent. Cross-national studies began to expand in the 
twenty-first century. Latin American voters demonstrated a longer  time horizon of 
economic voting by punishing both current and past incumbents (Benton, 2005) and 
seemed to adhere to the notion that economic voting is mediated by institutional context 
(Benton, 2005; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Interestingly, one of the conclusions 
that Johnson and Schweindt-Bayer reached was that during a bad economy, support for 
the president was reduced only under a divided government. The finding counters the 
theoretical assumption of clarity of responsibility, due to the fact that it notes that a 
minority government fails to blur clarity of responsibility.   
Cross-national studies of Latin American countries have paved the way for a 
breadth of economic voting research questions. For example, Johnson and Ryu (2010) 
examine whether presidential broken promises can condition the economic vote. The 
authors find that while president are not rewarded for keeping campaign promises, voters 
do take broken promises into account and thus economic voting is more important for 
promise breakers. Furthermore, voters are willing to support a president if broken 
promises can produce economic gains (Johnson and Ryu, 16). Singer and Gelineau 
(2010) examine whether voters respond to economic changes in a heterogeneous manner. 
Using the Latinobarometer (1995-2005) the authors conclude that economic voters are 
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heterogeneous voters. First the elderly are the least likely to base their vote on economics. 
Second, women are more likely to base their opinion of the incumbent on the 
unemployment rate. Finally, the unemployment rate is salient for the poor, while the rich 
focus on inflation.  
 Economic voting in Latin America has defied the traditional theoretical 
framework present in developed countries. While the latter has assumed a predominately 
retrospective, sociotropic orientation at the micro-level, economic voting in Latin 
America has demonstrated to be prospective. While single-country studies suffer from a 
lack of case study breadth, cross-national studies have expanded economic voting 
research in unprecedented ways.   
 Central and Eastern Europe 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union and the iron curtain, CEE countries began their 
democratization through a wave of electoral victories by pro-reform parties. These 
“democratic” parties placed emphasis on economic reforms and implemented various 
measures of shock therapy. The result was a reduction of standard of living of its 
citizenry, who had grown accustom to the state-socialist programs of full employment, 
public housing, and other subsidies. The illusionary promises by pro-reform parties 
combined with economic regression created a “withdrawal effect” in the electorate as 
voter turnout fell sharply throughout CEE. More importantly, it created a climate 
whereby the newly created leftist parties were able to capitalize on the economic sorrow 
of the public and gain electoral victories in such countries as Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania 
and Hungary. The “new left” too placed emphasis on democratization, while 
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simultaneously promoting a return to the social welfare system. The success of the “new 
left” was partly due to the fact that voters attributed its socialist roots as a heuristic for 
full employment and partly due to the fractionalization of pro-reform parties. In this 
sense, CEE voters, in their early stages, defied incumbency-oriented economic voting by 
engaging in positional (or transitional) economic voting
22
 (e.g. Wade et al., 1993; 
Fidrmuc, 2000a; Fidrmuc, 2000b; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009; Owen and Tucker, 
2010).   
The sudden downfall of state-socialist regimes combined with a hastily move 
towards privatization creates an intriguing case study for economic voting. A survey of 
works on economic voting in CEE denotes the prominence of unemployment as a 
determinant of the economic vote. This is not surprising, considering the socialist past of 
the region. A closer explanation of the literature demonstrates that single country works 
are prevalent in the region. An overwhelming majority of scholarship has concentrated 
towards Russia and Poland (Appendix A). At the cross-nation level, the majority of 
countries under observation are central European states. This is due to the relative 
successful democratization and economic transition of central Europe compared to its 
eastern neighbor.  
                                                 
22
 Tucker’s (2006) work on economic voting in transitional economies critiqued the application of CEVT in 
newly democratized countries with a socialist past. Tucker pointed out that the electorate based its voting 
on whether the party was a “new regime” or reformist party, or whether it was a “old regime” or anti-
reformist party. Furthermore, he demonstrated that new regime party success correlated with the success of 
economic conditions. In other words, in areas where the economy improved, new regime parties benefited. 
The opposite was true in the case of old regime parties, who benefited from the economy being worse. 
Thus, economic voting of post-communist countries defied the incumbency-oriented approach of CEVT. 
Voters instead based their vote on the ideological nature of the party, whether it represented the “new 
regime” or the “old regime”. Tucker termed this phenomenon as the “transitional identity model” of 
economic voting. 
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 Macro-level works on Russia suffer from the autocracy dilemma of economic 
voting, or the inability to properly measure economic voting at the macro-level due to the 
authoritarian nature of elections. For example, despite its neglect by western scholars, the 
1996 presidential reelection of incumbent Boris Yeltsin is a clear example of elections 
that lack freedom and fairness. The fact that the main opposition was a Communist 
candidate, Gennedy Zuganov, combined with the control of media outlets by pro-Yeltsin 
Russian oligarchs and various ballot manipulations completely blur the ability to rely on 
objective voting percentages for the incumbent. Needless to say, scholarship has taken 
mostly a microlevel approach (Colton, 1996; Hesli and Bashkirova, 2001; Mishler and 
Willerton, 2003; Richter, 2006)
23
. Of the microlevel works, there lacks a consensus as to 
which economic variable determines voter behavior. Russian voters intake a wide 
spectrum of economic behavior: sociotropic (Colton, 1996), pocketbook (Hesli and 
Bashkirova, 2001), retrospective (Mishler and Willerton, 2003), prospective (Hesli and 
Bashkirova), inflation (Mishler and Willerton, 2003), unemployment (Colton, 1996), 
wage arrears (Konitzer-Smirnov, 2003) and real wages (Richter, 2006) appear to 
influence the economic vote.   
 Scholarship on economic voting in Poland paints a clearer picture than its Eastern 
neighbor. The successful implementation of democracy in Poland has brought an almost 
equal share of macro (Wade et al., 1993; Gibson and Cielecka, 1995; Przeworski, 1996; 
Bell, 1997) and micro-level data (Powers and Cox, 1997; Bielasiak and Blunck, 2002; 
Owen and Tucker, 2010). Unemployment serves as the primary determinant of economic 
voting in an overwhelming majority of scholarship (see appendix A; but see Wade et al., 
                                                 
23
 Micro-level works on Russia get around the autocracy dilemma of economic voting by measuring 
individual perceptions instead of tainted macro-level vote results 
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1995). The significance of unemployment is consistent with theoretical assumptions of 
economic voting in CEE. Within the Polish electorate we begin to see the first signs of 
positional economic voting. The significance of unemployment also resonates in Hungary 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009) and Czech Republic (Coffey, 2013). 
 Cross-national studies have also demonstrated the significance of unemployment 
as a determinant of economic voting (see appendix A). Pacek’s (1994) study concluded 
that higher unemployment rate not only lowers the vote for pro-reform parties 
(incumbents) but also dampens voter turnout. The failure of pro-reform parties to bring 
about economic prosperities in such countries as Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and 
Bulgaria caused the disengagement of politics by the citizenry. The failure of pro-reform 
parties to stabilize macroeconomic indicators led the electorate to seek new-leftist 
political parties. Economic voting in CEE takes place within a high number of political 
parties. According to Powell and Whitten’s hypothesis this should substantially blur the 
clarity of responsibility which in turn should limit the presence of economic voting. 
However, Tucker’s (2001) results demonstrate that prosperous economic conditions are 
beneficial to “primary incumbents” than to “other incumbents”.  Thus, voters are able to 
differentiate between “degrees of incumbency” and assign greater responsibility to 
primary incumbents, despite the abundance of coalition governments in CEE.  
Fidrmuc (2000a; 2000b) demonstrates that voters in CEE base their economic 
vote on the position of economic reform. In other words, economic voting is not 
incumbency-oriented, but on the party position of reforms (Fidrmuc, 2000a). As such, the 
existence of economic voting in CEE lacks the incumbency-oriented status of reward and 
punishment. This is further solidified with the positive relationship between 
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unemployment and leftist political parties (Fidrmuc, 2000b). Roberts’ (2008) work 
provides further empirical grounds of the significance of unemployment. However, more 
important is the fact that Roberts finds that voters dish out more punishment than reward.   
 Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Of all the regions, Sub-Saharan Africa continues to receive the least scholarly 
attention on the relationship between economics and elections (see appendix A). 
According to Posner and Simon (2002), the reason for a lack of research can be attributed 
to the continuous infant and volatile nature of democracy in Africa. In addition, 
macroeconomic data limitations substantially paralyze the ability to perform reliable 
scholarship on economic voting in Africa. While the scarcity of macroeconomic data 
provides an explanation as to the potential reason of scholarly neglect at the macro-level, 
the introduction of the Afrobarometer dataset has failed to gather scholarly attention.  
 Economic voting in Africa is unique in that the determinant of the vote is 
substantially impacted by ethnicity (Posner and Simon, 2002; Youde, 2005; Bratton et al., 
2012). Thus, any empirical scholarship has to account for ethnic affiliation as a control 
mechanism. Posner and Simon (2002) observe the relationship between economics and 
elections in the 1991 and 1996 Zambian election using a combination of individual level 
surveys and district-level electoral data. Controlling for ethnic background, age, gender 
and urban residence, the authors find that voters in 1996 based their vote on perceptions 
of the economy. At the macro-level, the economy was operationalized as the poverty rate 
and depth, and only reached significance when observed as a change from 1991 to 1996. 
Despite the presence of economic voting, Posner and Simon conclude ethnic affiliation 
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and territorial location explain the “lions share” of the vote. Additionally, Posner and 
Simon demonstrate that punishment of the incumbent occurred through “withdrawal”, an 
abstention process. Youde’s (2005) work on economic voting in Ghana, concludes that 
“prospective economic evaluations are almost twice as important as retrospective ones in 
determining a given person’s support for the government” (Youde, 11). In demonstrating 
the presence of economic perceptions on the vote, Youde too finds the significant impact 
of ethnicity. Tche (2009) compares the GDP growth rate with the percentage of the 
electoral vote during the 1992, 1997 and 2004 presidential elections in Cameroon. Tche’s 
methodology lacks the use of regression techniques; he concludes that higher GDP 
growth was associated with higher percentage of the vote for the incumbent, Paul Biya. 
Michelitch et al., (2012) study draws a comparison between “conditional” prospective 
economic voting questions in the United States and Ghana. Although the authors motive 
is to demonstrate the improper understanding of prospective economic voting questions, 
their results confirm that voters acted on prospective intentions when assessing the 2008 
Ghanaian presidential elections   
 Bratton et al. (2012) is the sole work in the cross-national context. The authors 
make use of the Afrobarometer dataset in order to test the prominent determinants of the 
vote: ethnicity, economy and party. The study confirms earlier results of single country 
studies: that African voters simultaneously engage in both ethnic and economic voting. 
Specifically, within the context of economic voting, voters are prospective and 
sociotropic. The prominence of prospective economic voting parallels results in Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe.    
 Asia 
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 Research on economic voting in Asia focuses on South and East Asia. This comes 
as no surprise given that the two sub-regions contain many of the democratic regimes in 
the area. Although scarce in Central Asia and the Middle East, scholarship has began to 
evolve in the latter with recent works demonstrating economic voting in Turkey 
(Carkoglu, 1997; Hazama, 2006; Akarca and Tansel, 2006; 2007) and Israel (Sheafer, 
2008). Throughout the continent there seems to be a direct correlation between a 
country’s level of democracy and the scholarly attention it receives with respect to 
economic voting. This again is of little surprise as democratization is a precondition to 
empirically test any determinant of voting at the macro-level. 
 Economic voting in the Middle East has thus far been strictly single country 
studies of Turkey and Israel. While Israel has had an institutionalized government for half 
a century, Turkey has been marked by numerous military coups which result in the 
banning of parties, only to reappear with rebranding years later. Despite having a volatile 
quasi-democracy, scholarship on Turkey has exceeded academic expectations. Having a 
predominately macro-level nature, research has demonstrated that growth rate (Akarca 
and Tansel, 2006; 2007) and inflation (Carkoglu, 1997; Akarca and Tansel, 2006) are 
predictors of the Turkish vote. At the microlevel, Hazama (2006) found that when voters 
act in retrospective fashion, they do so through a pocketbook lens and when voters assess 
the economic prospectively, they do so with a sociotropic lens. Economic voting in 
Turkey also demonstrates that Turkish voters dish out reward and punishment to the 
primary incumbent party (Akarca and Tansel, 2006; 2007), a finding that parallels 
research in the developing world (Wilkin et al., 1997; Tucker, 2001). 
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 Economic Voting in the south and eastern Asian subcontinent has primarily 
focused on South Korea (Wade and Kang, 1990; Lee, 2011; Lee and Glasure, 2012) with 
less work on India (Meyer and Malcolm, 1993; Tandon, 2012) and Taiwan (Hsieh et al., 
1998; Choi, 2010). Given the one-party dominant democracy of Taiwan, works have 
assumed a micro-level approach with vote choice being dependent on prospective (Hseih 
et al., 1998) and sociotropic (Choi, 2010) economic evaluations. The two works on India 
lack a consensus on the presence of economic voting. While Meyer and Malcolm (1993) 
found a relationship between GDP and vote for the incumbent party, Tandon (2012) 
dismissed tariffs as a determinant of economic voting during tariff reforms in the 1990s. 
In fact, the author finds that the incumbent party was actually rewarded for the 
liberalization of tariffs, which negatively impacted domestic industries. Tandon notes of 
the pattern to reward the incumbent for shock therapy as a sign of voter sophistication.   
 Within Asia, economic voting in South Korea presents an interesting case study. 
Historically, scholarship on voting behavior in Korea has demonstrated strong regional 
orientation (Lee and Glasure, 2012). Despite the “regionalization” of voting, Wade and 
Kang (1990) were able to evaluate the impact on economics on the 1988 legislative vote 
using district level data. They included a control variable for region and concluded that 
the rate of unemployment was inversely associated with the vote for the Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP). The scarcity of economic voting in Korea changed with the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 (Lee, 2011; Kang, 2013). As the economy increasingly became a 
salient issue, Korean voters began demonstrating traces of retrospective and sociotropic 
orientations (Lee, 2011; Lee and Glasure, 2012). Interestingly, during the 2007 Korean 
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presidential election, the impact economic voting managed to outweigh regionalism on 
voter behavior (Lee, 2011).  
State of the Literature 
 The extensive literature review provides support for the fact that a CEVT-oriented 
approach is inconsistent with works on developing countries. First, developing countries 
provide more dynamic results as to whether voters are pocketbook or sociotropic and 
retrospective or prospective. Based on Western theoretical pillars, CEVT assumes that 
voters exhibit retrospective and sociotropic economic perceptions. As evident by the 
works presented above, micro-level economic perceptions are much more dynamic and 
thus inconsistent with CEVT assumptions (see graph below). Second, the absence of a 
strong political preference in voter behavior makes economic voting in developing 
countries more prominent than in mature democracies. Of the sixty-seven works on 
developing countries, only six failed to demonstrate patterns of economic voting. With 
over ninety percent of the works confirming economic voting, it may very well be that 
economic voting is more abundant in developing countries than in developed ones. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of economic voting determinants in 
developing country studies 
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 Economic perceptions are more equally distributed in developing countries than 
in developed countries. Interestingly, voters tend exhibit greater levels of prospective 
perceptions than retrospective perceptions. Why is this so? An answer may lie in the 
minimal time horizon of incumbent parties. The fact that party volatility is more 
prevalent in developing democracies means that parties preside over the country for 
limited amounts of time. This creates the effect that political parties fail to gain an 
adequate time horizon to present voters with a retrospective economic record. As such, 
voters place emphasis on prospective perceptions. The dominance of unemployment 
stems for its consistent presence in CEE literature. In fact of the seventeen works which 
identify unemployment as an economic determinant of the vote, eleven come from CEE 
studies.  
 In summary, a discussion of the current literature on economic voting in the 
developing world provides for a contrasting theoretical approach. While the sociotropic 
pillar of CEVT may be applicable, voters in developing countries tend to be 
prospectively-oriented. This is due to the infant nature of party systems and political 
volatility. At the macro-level unemployment is clearly a dominant economic determinant 
of the vote in CEE and inflation in Latin America. Finally, the ongoing debate on the 
asymmetry of the vote provides further critique of CEVT as a durable theoretical 
framework.  
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Chapter 4 – Research Design 
 As noted in chapter three, empirical work on economic voting has been plagued 
by methodological problems. From the omnipotent ecological fallacy, to the presence of 
the Kramer problem, the research design of studies has been the most complex and 
debated aspect of scholarship on economic voting. To avoid erroneously inferring macro-
level results to individual voters, this paper implements both a macro and micro-level 
methodology. At the micro-level, using a large N-size approach can further help to gain 
leverage over the inferential capability of the study.  In both cases the research 
implements the use of the V-function, instead of the P-function. As noted by Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier (2008), the problem with popularity functions stems from the fact that it 
lacks a direct relationship with what economic voting is ultimately attempting to 
understand: the vote.  
Macro-level Methodology: Brief Overview 
 At the macro level, this study aims to demonstrate a relationship between the 
incumbent vote and macroeconomic performance. Testing economic voting at the macro-
level provides several benefits. First, as Kramer (1983) notes, the bias in aggregate-level 
data is modest and traceable when compared with its micro counterpart (Kramer, 93). 
Second, historically evidence from aggregate-level data on economic voting has been 
more consistent (Jacobson and Kernell, 1981). Third, aggregate-level data provide 
interpretations of actual economic voting. Surveys results simply record views of the 
citizenry, but fail to show whether such views are actually enforced during an electoral 
cycle. In other words, surveys may point out the presence of subjective economic 
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perception, but those perceptions may fail to carry over toward the voting booth. 
Ultimately, it is the vote that puts the voting in economic voting.  
Macro-level methodology, however, isn’t without its own set of limitations. 
According to Lewis-Beck (1986), aggregate time-series models fail to specify when 
economic voting actually occurs. Second, aggregate models lack the psychological 
element, present in individual surveys of the vote (MacKuen et al., 1992). Third, macro-
level models tend to suffer from small sample size and tend to result in serial correlation 
(Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Wilkin et al., 1997). Fourth, measurement at the aggregate 
fails to account for non-economic variables such as party identification, which may create 
issues of endogeneity due to omitted political variables (Lewis-Beck, 1986). Finally, 
macro-level models are unable to create individualistic distinguishing characteristics (e.g. 
retrospective, prospective, pocketbook, sociotropic, etc.) and aggregate results have to be 
carefully analyzed so as to avoid the charge of ecological fallacy. 
Macro-level Methodology: Data and Model 
With the following caveats in mind, the macro-level aspect of the research will 
address the relationship between the incumbent vote and economic conditions in 
developing countries. As noted in the introduction, to merit inclusion, a developing 
country must be classified by the IMF as a emerging and developing economy and have 
(1) competitive multiparty elections and (2) a elected legislature, specifically the lower 
house
24
. Election cases were then selected based on the democracy score of six and above 
                                                 
24
 One of the criteria for identifying democracies proposed by Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) is that the 
incumbent yield office. The reason this criteria was not included is due to the fact that the inclusion would 
omit the country of Botswana, one of the beacons fro democracy in Africa. Although elections are 
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from Polity IV “democ” index. The “six and above” threshold has been widely used to 
differentiate between degrees of electoralability (e.g. Hellwig and Samuels, 2008). The 
total number of countries included in the study is sixty-six countries with a total election 
sample size of three hundred thirty one
25
. The time period of the study spans from 1980 
until 2012. Given the lack of economic data availability prior to 1980 in databases such 
as the IMF World Economic Indicators, beginning the time series in 1980 is reasonable. 
In addition, because most of the developing countries are part of the so-called “third 
wave” of democratization, using 1980 as a starting point is unavoidable due to data 
limitations on elections prior to that year. 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable, which is the percentage of votes 
received by the incumbent party (and alliance)
26
, is perhaps the most prominent measure 
of the incumbency-oriented CEVT (e.g., Pacek and Radcliff, 1995). Rather than 
measuring the change in the incumbent vote, I relied on the absolute measure of the 
vote
27
. In order to maintain consistency, the data for the dependent variable was obtained 
from a limited number of sources, prominently from Dieter Nohlen’s multivolume set on 
electoral data and from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 
“Election guide” website. Nohlen’s work is perhaps the most comprehensive account of 
electoral data ever assembled. The following volumes from Nohlen were used to 
assemble the data on the incumbent vote: Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (1999), 
Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook Vol. 1 (2001), Elections in Asia and 
                                                                                                                                                 
conducted in a democratic manner, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has won every single national 
assembly election since 1984, which under Cheibub and Przeworski’s criteria would mar its omission. 
25
 Haiti was dropped from the study due to the fact that reliable electoral data was unavailable. 
26
  
27
 Using the change in incumbent vote would require me to drop the first election of each country (in order 
to properly measure change, change of the first election would be nil) which would severely limit my 
sample size 
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the Pacific: A Data Handbook Vol. II (2001), Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook Vol. I (2005), Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook Vol. II (2005), 
Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook (2010). 
Electoral data in Africa and the Americas is scarcer than its Central and Eastern 
European counterparts. Thus in addition to the two sources, electoral data was also 
obtained from Andy Baker’s Latin American election results with party ideology scores 
and the African Elections Database. Reliance on virtual databases, ensured that the data 
were up-to-date.  
Independent Variables. To control for past elections, I include a lagged dependent 
variable. Theoretically, inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is due to the “ceiling 
effect” which states that incumbent support is likely to decline following a gain (Rose 
and Mackie, 1983). This feeds off the notion of the “cost of ruling”, which states that as 
the number of years in which a incumbent party rules increases, its vote share is likely to 
decrease due to the “discouraged voter” effect. Thus, I hypothesize that the lagged 
dependent variable will be inversely related to vote for the incumbent.  
The main economic indicator is operationalized as the annual change in real per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP), or the growth rate during the election year. Pacek 
and Radcliff (1995) indicate that the growth rate is the best measure of the material well-
being of the electorate (Pacek and Radcliff, 750). In fact, in a recent synopsis of the state 
of affairs in economic voting, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013) noted that growth is a 
robust determinant of the vote, while inflation is no longer a primary determinant.  Data 
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for the growth rate was obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Indicators and the 
World Bank’s economic database.    
The regression equations follow a traditional economic voting equation pattern 
where,   
                             
                                          
                                             
                                               
                                                
Vote
28
 is the percentage of votes received by the incumbent during time t in 
country c,    is the lagged dependent variable and    is the economic indicator. With 
regard to the Latin American region, the vote function includes an additional 
macroeconomic determinant. This is due to Latin America’s history with hyperinflation 
and the prevalence of inflation in prior works on Latin America (See appendix A). The 
vote function for Central and Eastern Europe includes the unemployment determinant 
                                                 
28
 This model assumes that voter turnout is constant throughout the time series and that economic voting  is 
not mediated by the turnout rate. Modeling voter turnout as a mediating covariate between macroeconomic 
indicators and the vote is beyond the scope of the paper. However, a snapshot of the descriptive statistics 
on voter turnout rates demonstrates that voter turnout tends to be higher during periods of economic crisis, 
the so-called mobilization effect. During the hyperinflationary period of the Latin American Debt Crisis 
(1982-1990) the mean voter turnout was 73.09%. After the end of the crisis, the average declines to 66.02 
(1991-2008). In Africa, the period between 1979 and 1999 is generally regarded as fairly crisis prone. The 
mean voter turnout was 70.61%. In the period 2000 to 2012, the average voter turnout declines o 64.90%. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, the transition period (1990-96) produced an average voter turnout of 
66.61%. Following the transition period, voter turnout declines to 59.76%. Finally, in Asia during the 
inflationary period of the Asian Financial Crisis (1995-1999) average turnout was 69.07%. Following the 
AFC, turnout declines to 67.22% (2000-2008). In all cases voter turnout during an region-wide economic 
crisis increased voter turnout thus creating a “mobilizing effect.”  
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due to CEE’s historical experience with state-socialism and full employment. 
Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of literature on CEE has acknowledged the 
presence of unemployment as an economic determinant of the vote. The African and 
Asian model lacks unemployment and inflation indicators for several reasons. First, the 
scarcity of employment data on African countries prevents the inclusion of the 
unemployment statistic. Furthermore, Africa has not experienced a period of 
hyperinflationary pressures. With regard to Asia, scholarship has failed to assess the 
prominence of inflation or unemployment. Despite the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
which produced inflationary pressures, the countries in the sample avoided runaway 
inflation. Finally, including both inflation and unemployment in the same model runs the 
risk of collinearity (due to the Phillips Curve). However, excluding the “full model” all 
together will fail to note how the possibility of collinearity will effect either inflation or 
unemployment. Thus, the “full model” in the next chapter should be assessed with 
caution. 
According to macro-level theory, it is expected that the growth rate will be 
positively associated with the vote for the incumbent. In other words, the higher the 
growth, the more likely that incumbent government will be politically rewarded. Both 
inflation and unemployment are expected to be inversely associated with the vote. A 
plethora of literature has demonstrated that a rise in inflation and unemployment tends to 
hurt the incumbent party, as both indicators demonstrate a regressive economy.   
Since the data are observations repeated over time across the same units, the 
model may be described as a cross-sectional time-series or panel data model. Having a 
panel model not only strengthens the causal inference process (Finkel, 1995), it also 
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increases leverage of the data. Inclusion of a lagged endogenous covariate (lagged 
dependent variable or LDV) in the model specifies the nature of the model: conditional 
change panel model. The use of panel data, however, has its drawbacks. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are particularly problematic with cross-sectional 
time-series (Stimson, 1985; Beck and Katz, 1995). As such, reliance on OLS is 
problematic due to the fact that the estimates of the standard errors will be anti-
conservative
29
. After a White and Breusch-Pagan (BP) test, it was determined that the 
panel data indeed suffered from heteroskedastcitiy. Thus, relying on Beck and Katz’s 
(1995) remedy, the paper uses panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) to estimate the 
model. PCSE relaxes the Gauss-Markov assumptions by assuming that the disturbances 
are heteroskedastic. 
Pooled cross-section time series data is also prone to autocorrelation. The issue of 
serial correlation is controlled for by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
30
. Beck 
and Katz (1996) note that using PCSE with time series cross-sectional data is better apt at 
addressing the issue of serial correlation than the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and 
timewise autocorrelated model (CHTA) proposed by Jan Kmenta (1986). Beck and Katz 
(1996) critiqued the Kmenta method as correcting for serial correlation, but in the process 
producing “downwardly biased estimates” (Beck and Katz 1996, 8). The Beck and Katz 
                                                 
29
 Running an OLS model with panel data (time series cross section) gives us inaccurate standard errors. As 
per Beck and Kats, the model retains OLS parameters, but with panel corrected standard errors.  
30
 Critics have asserted that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable creates a correlation between the 
variable and the error term. However in Beck and Katz (2011) the authors note that the lagged dependent 
variable provides similar coefficient estimates as first-order serially correlated error model. See Appendix 
D for a comparison between LDV and AR1 coefficients.   
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remedy of including a lagged dependent variable ensures that “residuals are serially 
independent” (Beck and Katz 1996, 15)31. 
Microlevel Methodology: Brief Overview 
Reliance on microlevel methodology presents several advantages with respect to 
inferential capability. First and foremost, according to Lewis-Beck (1986), the proper 
manner in which to assess the relationship between economics and voters is to study 
voters themselves. Having individual level data achieves this condition. Second, 
microlevel allows one to measure the characteristics of the individual economic voter, 
and specifically the distinctions among retrospective and prospective, and pocketbook 
and sociotropic. Third, the benefit of survey data is that it tends to be “soft” meaning that 
it is “not so susceptible to fancy statistical manipulation” (Fiorina 1978, 430). Fourth, 
using micro-level data allows the empirical assessment of the “grievance asymmetry” 
issue without risking guilt of the ecological fallacy. Finally, micro-level data allows for 
the numerous control variables, especially party identification and socio-demographics.  
Microlevel data also has its limitations too. The most prominent drawback is its 
inability to mirror findings of its aggregate counterpart. While much of early works on 
economic voting at the macro-level found substantial results, microlevel works were 
unable to imitate the success. Second, there are often discrepancies between the findings 
of microlevel studies and actual votes. Kuklinski and West (1981) noted that in NES 
survey based on the 1978 congressional elections, fifty-four percent of the respondents 
                                                 
31
 In testing for autocorrelation, the lack of a lagged dependent variable derives a large – ρ - “rho” estimate 
which exemplifies serial correlation. With the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, ρ decreases 
dramatically, signifying that the lagged dependent variable is controlling for serial correlation. 
  
74 
 
noted that they had voted in the election, yet the actual vote was thirty-five percent
32
. It is 
not uncommon in polls to witness inflated numbers for action-prone questions such as 
voting. Finally, evidence of economic voting at the microlevel doesn’t necessarily 
correspond to actual economic voting. Voters may present subjective perceptions of the 
economy that leads one to conclude that voters are retrospective, sociotropic but in an 
actual vote setting, such as an election, citizens may fail to act as economic voters.    
Microlevel Methodology: Data and Model 
 The availability of several individual level surveys has allowed microlevel 
scholarship to expand testing of economic voting theory. Among the various data sets, 
the “barometer” surveys have consistently provided support for economic voting in Latin 
America (Singer and Gelineau, 2010; Gelineau, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013), 
Central and Eastern Europe (Harper, 2000), Africa (Youde, 2005; Bratton et al., 2012; 
Gelineau, 2013), and Asia (Lee and Glasure, 2012; Gelineau, 2013). Waves of 
Latinobarometer and Afrobarometer provide the necessary data to model economic 
perceptions on the vote. That said, the current wave of the Eurobarometer lacks in-depth 
questionnaires on political affiliation and voting behavior. In addition, the vote 
questionnaire in the Asianbarometer assumes a retrospective characteristic (which parties 
or candidates for president did you vote for?). Thus, a comparative analysis among the 
four barometers is not possible given the differences in the items in vote choice. As such, 
the microlevel analysis was limited to the study third and fourth wave of the 
Afrobarometer and the 2005 and 2008 wave of the Latinobarometer. Despite the 
                                                 
32
 A micro-level study might find a relationship between economic perceptions and vote for the incumbent. 
However, voters who note they either voted or intend to vote for the incumbent may not resonate at the 
macro-level. Voters may either have “withdrawal” symptoms of fail to vote on the basis of economics.  
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omission of Asian and CEE countries, the current dataset includes thirty-two of the sixty-
six countries. 
                                                  
                           
Dependent Variable. As previously noted, measurement of the response variable 
is performed using either vote or popularity function. To get at the core of understanding 
the association between economics and voting, it is necessary to empirically assess the v-
function. The Afro and Latinobarometer both provide a voting questionnaire that 
measures intention to vote in a hypothetical election. The Afrobarometer specifically asks 
respondents on voting behavior towards presidential elections: If a presidential election 
were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for? The Latinobarometer 
fails to specify the electoral institution by asking: If there were elections tomorrow, which 
party would you vote for? For the purpose of maintaining comparability, the vote 
questionnaire in the Latinobarometer was applied toward presidential elections. The 
dependent variable is dichotomous, coded with “1” for respondents who would vote for 
the incumbent party (and/or alliance), and “0” otherwise. 
Independent Variables. Both the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer include 
items that measure various perceptions of the economy. Specifically, the Afrobarometer 
and Latinobarometer include questions that measure individual economic perceptions in a 
retrospective egotropic, retrospective sociotropic, prospective egotropic, and prospective 
sociotropic manner. Table 4.1 provides an overview of each item. The response is 
measured on a five-point scale, ranging from economic conditions are much worse, 
worse, same, better, or much better. Economic voting posits that positive economic 
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perceptions are associated with intention to vote for the incumbent. Thus, a respondent 
who perceives the economy as either improving or having been improved is more likely 
to support the incumbent than one who has a negative evaluation of the economy. 
 Aside from economic perceptions, several control variables are included in the 
model in order to properly measure voting behavior. Literature on voting behavior has 
demonstrating that party identification is a major determinant of the vote in developed 
countries (Campbell et al., 1960; Lewis-Beck et al., 2009). Although some developing 
democracies do not yet have institutionalized party systems, including an indicator of 
party identification can help us understand the nature of the relationship between political 
association and the vote. Unfortunately, the Latinobarometer lacks a corresponding 
question on party identification. Thus, an ideology indicator was substituted to preserve 
the notion that political identification influences the vote. While the lack of a party 
identification item prevents one from examining its influence in a pooled model, we will 
be able to observe its effect in the African dataset. 
 The party identification indicator was coded as a binary variable with “1” 
representing identification with the incumbent party and “0” representing identification 
with non-incumbent parties. The “ideology” indicator consists of a scale measuring a 
typical left-right ideology spectrum with “0” being left and “10” being right. In Latin 
America, despite the volatile history of political party platforms, party ideology (across a 
left-right spectrum) has for the most part remained stable. Thus, ideology is a reasonable 
proxy for party identification in Latin America, as ideologies of political party platforms 
closely parallel the left-right ideological spectrum.  
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Table 4.1: Perceptions of the Economy questionnaires  
Looking back, how do you rate the following 
compared to twelve months ago: Economic 
conditions in this country? 
Retrospective, Sociotropic Afrobarometer 
Looking back, how do you rate the following 
compared to twelve months ago: Your living 
conditions? 
Retrospective, Egotropic Afrobarometer 
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be 
better or worse: Economic conditions in this country 
in 
twelve months time? 
Prospective, Sociotropic Afrobarometer 
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be 
better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve 
months time? 
Prospective, Egotropic Afrobarometer 
Do you consider the country’s present economic 
situation to be much better, a little better, about 
the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 
months 
ago? 
Retrospective, Sociotropic Latinobarometer 
Do you consider your economic situation and that 
of your family to be much better, a little better, 
about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 
months ago? 
Retrospective, Egotropic Latinobarometer 
And over the next 12 months do you think that, 
in general, the country’s economic situation will be 
much better, a little better, about the same, a little 
worse or much worse than now? 
Prospective, Sociotropic Latinobarometer 
In the next 12 months, do you think your 
economic situation and that of your family will be 
much better, a little better, about the same, a little 
worse or much worse than now? 
Prospective, Egotropic Latinobarometer 
 
 In addition, the model also includes standard controls for sex, age, and education. 
Sex was coded as a binary variable with a “1” being male and a “0” being female. Age 
and education were coded with a series of dichotomous covariates with the reference 
category being sixteen to thirty-five for age, and no education for the education covariate.  
At the regional level, controlling for ethnicity and rural residency (in Africa) is important 
towards properly understanding the effects of economic perceptions on the vote. Prior 
works on Africa have demonstrated the saliency of ethnic voting. Thus, the model 
controls for ethnic saliency and whether the respondent hails from an urban or rural 
setting. Ethnic saliency is operationalized by a questionnaire asking respondents to either 
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identify with either their ethnicity, national identity, or both
33
. Ethnicity was coded on a 
five point scale ranging from “-2” to “2”. If the respondent identified solely with the 
ethnic group a score of -2 would be assigned. If the respondent identified solely with the 
nationality a score of 2 would be assigned. The coding would ensure that if ethnic voting 
is a significant determinant of the vote, then the coefficient should be negatively 
associated with the vote. Rural residency was coded as a binary variable assuming a “1” 
if the respondent resided in a rural setting and 0 otherwise.  
The second part of the micro-model attempts to understand whether voter place 
symmetric weight on good and bad economic times. The paper follows the methodology 
proposed by Lewis-Beck (1988) to assess the asymmetric effects of voting. In his 
assessment of economic voting in mature democracies, Lewis-Beck provides an 
asymmetry of the vote model: 
                                
Where   indicates a positive response towards the government effect on the 
economy last year;    indicates a negative response towards the government effect on the 
economy last year;    indicates a positive response towards the government effect on the 
economy next year;    indicates a negative response towards the government effect on 
the economy next year. All variables are measured in a dichotomous manner. Since the 
model assumes a “government effect” on the economy, it is naturally a sociotropic 
phenomenon. Thus, sociotropic retrospective and sociotropic prospective evaluations 
                                                 
33
 The question is as follows: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a 
[Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a ________[respondent’s identity group]. Which of these two groups do 
you feel most strongly attached to?” The respondent may choose to identify solely or primarily with the 
ethnic group, solely or primarily with the nationality or indentify equally with both. 
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were recoded as “dummy” variables in order to contrast a positive perception from a 
negative one. 
The asymmetry of the vote can occur in several manners. First, voters may punish 
but fail to reward the incumbent for the economy. Second, voters may act in the opposite 
manner: they may reward but fail to punish. Third, voters may reward and punish but not 
towards the same degree. Punishment may exceed reward, or reward may exceed 
punishment. The presence of both punishment and reward doesn’t necessarily mean that 
voters punish and reward even-handedly. Relaxing the “grievance asymmetry” 
hypothesis to include both punishment and reward but of varying degrees can help extend 
the understanding of voter reaction towards the economy.    
Conclusion 
A “dualistic” approach of a macro and micro-level analysis can help increase 
leverage over inferences made towards understanding economic voting in developing 
countries. While a macro-level interpretation is necessary towards understanding the 
relationship between the actual vote for the incumbent and macroeconomic indicators, a 
micro-level analysis provides an in-depth account of individual perceptions of the 
economy. Furthermore, individual-level analysis can also reveal whether forms of voter 
asymmetry are existent in the developing world. 
Reliance on a cross-regional sample can simultaneously increase our N-size and 
provide a world-wide sample of developing countries. Using the v-function (instead of 
the p-function) helps to “truly” test for the presence of economic voting. At the macro-
level, inclusion of a lagged dependent variable helps control for serial correlation while 
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also testing the “cost of ruling” effect. At the micro-level, inclusion of socio-demographic 
controls helps to properly understand the effect of economic perceptions on vote 
intentions. Finally, the presence of socio-demographic variables allows for the analysis of 
possible interaction effects between perceptions of the economy and age, education and 
sex. 
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Chapter 5 – Empirical Results and Discussion 
Economic voting in the developing world has seldom been tested at the cross-
regional level. In attempting to fill the vacuum, the following chapter summarizes the 
results of the macro and micro-level modeling of economic voting, along with whether 
voting takes place within a symmetrical framework. After presenting the results, the 
chapter then discusses both the statistical and substantive significance of the various 
models and the overall application of CEVT in the developing context. 
Does economic performance affect voting for the incumbent? To anticipate, the 
results presented in this chapter suggest that at both the macro and micro-level, voter 
behavior is influenced by the economy. With macro-level models, we see that voting for 
the incumbent is predominately influenced by growth rate. While the significance of 
growth rate fluctuates at the regional level, its association with vote for the incumbent is 
clearly present in cross-regional models. At the micro-level, I find that voters in 
developing countries associate themselves with sociotropic evaluations. Although both 
retrospective and prospective perceptions of the economy are predictors of vote intention, 
the magnitude of the latter surpasses the former. Finally, the asymmetry voting model 
provides evidence that voters punish the incumbent for economic downturn and reward it 
for periods of economic prosperity. However, the magnitude of punishment and reward 
differs when voters operate within a retrospective and prospective assumption.   
Macro-level Results 
 Table 5.1 presents the results of the pooled model with observations from all 
regions. Looking first at the adjusted R-squared in each trial, we see that the trials 
consistently explains about one-third of the variance in vote for the incumbent. The 
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variance in the dependent variable of the full model must be interpreted with caution 
given the potential of collinearity between inflation and unemployment. However, even 
when unemployment and inflation are omitted in models three and four, the variance of 
the dependent variable explained by the model continues at approximately one-third. 
Table 5.1: Cross-Regional Regression Results 
34
  
Dependent Variable: Incumbent share of total legislative vote in national assemblies 
Covariate Model1: Full 
Model 
Model 2: 
Growth 
Model 
Model 3: Growth 
+ Unemployment 
Model 4: Growth + 
Inflation 
     
Vote Lag       .51*** 
(.06) 
     .52*** 
(.06) 
     .49*** 
(.06) 
     .54*** 
(.06) 
Growth       .63*** 
(.17) 
      .50*** 
(.15) 
      .61*** 
(.16) 
     .49*** 
(.15) 
Unemployment   .23* 
(.14) 
 .20 
(.14) 
 
Inflation .30 
(.58) 
  .09 
(.54) 
Adj. R-squared 
n-size 
 
.32 
210 
.33 
258 
.31 
216 
.35 
250 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10  
 
Interestingly, the coefficient for the lagged vote covariate is positive and 
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a unit change in the percentage 
of the incumbent vote of t-1 increases the vote for the incumbent by half a percentage 
point. In all four models, the coefficient for lagged dependent variable is consistently 
significant and positive. This dispels any account of the “cost of governing” effect in the 
                                                 
34
Prior to running the current model, I ran estimations of the macro-level data model with dummy variables 
for each country. I was unable to find countries with summed residuals and residual variance ratios that 
were above three times the mean of the dependent variable. Thus, re-estimating the model with fixed 
effects proved to be unnecessary because the diagnostics did not reveal any influential unit (fixed) effects. 
Running a “xtreg” model in Stata 13 with fixed effects and random effects provided similar results of my 
macroeconomic covariates as in the stated “xtpcse” model.  
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developing world. In addition, the lagged vote covariate controls for any autocorrelation 
in the models (see note 4 in chapter four). 
The most significant aspect of the pooled world-wide models is the fact that the 
coefficient for economic growth consistently achieves statistical significance and is in the 
predicting direction. Its positive association with the incumbent vote implies that an 
increase in the growth rate corresponds to an increase in the vote for the incumbent. 
Specifically, in Model 1, a one percent increase in the growth rate corresponds with a .63 
percent increase in the vote for the incumbent party, ceteris peribus. The magnitude of the 
coefficient in the other trials (models 2-4) is broadly consistent with the results in model 
1. 
Aside from growth rate, the only other economic indicator that achieves statistical 
significance is the rate of unemployment in the full model. Surprisingly, the coefficient 
for unemployment is in the opposite direction in models 1 and 3, implying that 
unemployment is positively associated with the vote for the incumbent. The coefficient 
for unemployment in model 3 is not significant, however, which suggests that 
unemployment is not a robust predictor of incumbent vote. 
Finally, the coefficient for inflation fails to achieve significance in any of the 
trials. This shows that after adjusting for the influence of other covariates in the models, 
inflation had no effect, on average, on incumbents’ vote performance. 
Macro-level Discussion 
The economy is widely held to be an underlying issue towards the success of 
incumbent parties given the volatile nature of the macroeconomy and the lack of a 
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durable party system in the developing world. When attempting to further understand the 
relationship between the economy and elections by analyzing the determinants of the 
economic vote, the results paint a very telling picture of the influence of the economic 
performance on incumbent parties in the developing world.   
 The most promising finding of the world-wide models is the significance of 
economic growth as a consistent economic determinant of the vote. Similar to the 
conclusion of a review of the literature produced by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013), 
growth in GDP has assumed the role of a prominent indicator in determining the 
economic vote. Indeed, the significance of growth as a determinant of the vote is in line 
with numerous works measuring the economic vote. The saliency of the growth rate has 
been demonstrated in various different contexts including early works on U.S. 
presidential elections (Fair, 1973; 1978), in advanced industrial countries (Powell and 
Whitten, 1993), Latin America (Benton, 2005; Singer and Gelineau, 2010), Middle East 
(Akarca and Tansel, 2006; 2007; Sheafter, 2008) a sample of developed and developing 
countries (Wilkin et al., 1997) and the overall developing world (Pacek and Radcliff, 
1995).    
Critics of the significance of growth within economic voting literature point to its 
abstract-like characteristic as a reason for its exclusion. This may be a point contested at 
the micro-level, where voters would have a difficult time giving a proper perception. 
However, at the macro-level, the notion that growth increases vote percentages for the 
incumbent is in line with the most fundamental understanding of economic voting which 
posits that voters punish and reward the incumbent in accordance with the regressive and 
progressive nature of the economy.  
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The unemployment measure has consistently demonstrated an effect in economic 
voting literature, specifically in CEE case studies. Thus, the question remains as to why 
at the world-wide level, does unemployment have the opposite effect on the vote in 
developing countries. An answer may be found in the understanding of the degree of 
unemployment in the developing world. Aside from the fact that unemployment may be 
an ambiguous measure of economic rationality (Blount, 2002), the mean for employment 
in the sample was 10.3%, a much lower figure than expected. With a lack of social safety 
nets and work reform programs in the developing world, one would expect to witness a 
considerably higher unemployment percentage of total workforce. The failure of 
unemployment to inversely associate with incumbent vote may be due to the fact that 
unemployment may only matter when its level is unexpectedly high. Palmer and Whitten 
(1999) demonstrated that voters associate macroeconomic indicators with incumbent 
vote, only when such indicators are “unexpectedly” high. In other words, voters will not 
render punishment or reward when “expected” macroeconomic indicators are present. 
Thus, when macroeconomic variables are within their average then voters simply fail to 
associate such variables with incumbent performance. This may be the reason as to why 
unemployment (and inflation) fails to perform in the expected manner. 
As noted, inflation fails to achieve significance in all four models. The findings 
for inflation parallel Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier’s (2013) account of the macroeconomic 
variables determining the economic voting. The authors drop inflation as one of the two 
main determinants of the vote. The omission of inflation is not so much due to its lack of 
significance as to the recent prominence of unemployment, especially in CEE. The lack 
of significance for inflation may stem from the fact that the macroeconomic variable only 
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relates towards the incumbent when there’s a high degree of inflation (i.e., 
hyperinflation). As shall be demonstrated below, the hypothesis is confirmed within the 
Latin American same during the debt crisis years. 
 The variance in incumbent vote shares as explained by the models is 
approximately thirty-three percent. This parallels general findings within the discipline. 
In fact, Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) note that “economic changes explain about one-
third of the change in the vote” (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 114). Literature on single-
country studies naturally has tighter fitted models than their cross-national counterparts. 
In the developing realm, model variance in cross-national works has varied from an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.48 (Roberts, 2008) to 0.70 (Benton, 2005). Thus, while the 
model provides a modest fit, the extent to which model fitness is successful depends on 
the construction of economic measures and the inclusion of political controls (Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier, 2013). 
Regional Models 
 Table 5.2 provides the results for region-specific regressions. Because many 
economic crises tend to be overwhelmingly regionally-specific (e.g. Latin American debt 
crisis of 1982; Asian financial crisis of 1997-8; collapse of state-socialism in CEE in 
1989-92), it is important to test macroeconomic indicators within regions. While region-
specific models can help provide a more coherent understanding of economic voting, 
regional models are limited by a smaller and more volatile N-size (as exemplified in the 
table below). 
Table 5.2: Regional Regression Results   
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Dependent Variable: Incumbent share of total vote in national assemblies 
Covariate Model1: 
Latin 
America 
Model 2: 
Africa 
Model 3: CEE Model 4:Asia 
     
Vote Lag .46*** 
(.09) 
.40** 
.19 
.41*** 
(.13) 
.31* 
(.18) 
Growth .47** 
(.28) 
-.25 
.24 
.73*** 
(.18) 
.18 
(1.1) 
Unemployment   .03 
(.18) 
 
Inflation .48 
(.70) 
  -2.1 
(3.8) 
Adj. R-squared 
n-size 
 
.22 
119 
.17 
41 
.26 
66 
.11 
27 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10  
  
 In region specific models, the coefficient for lagged dependent variable continues 
to be positively associated with the percentage of incumbent vote. This further proves in 
region-specific models that the “cost of ruling” is absent in developing democracies. 
While the magnitude of the coefficient varies among regions, one can see that a one 
percent increase in the previous incumbent vote is associated with between .31 to .46 
percentage increase in the current incumbent vote, depending on the region. In terms of 
statistical significance Latin America and CEE have the lower probability of occurrence 
due to chance than Africa and Asia. 
 Although growth rate was consistently significant in the world-wide dataset, table 
5.2 demonstrates that the effect of the growth rate as a predictor of incumbent vote is 
region-specific. In Latin America and CEE, the coefficient for growth is statistically 
significant and in the expected direction, while in Asia growth rate fails to achieve 
statistical significance. In Africa, growth lacks not only statistical significance, but is also 
in the opposite direction. Of the two regions where growth rate performs as expected we 
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see that the magnitude differs substantially. In Latin America, the magnitude of the 
coefficient indicates that a one percentage increase in the growth rate results in .47 
percentage increase in the vote for the incumbent. In CEE, the effect is substantially 
larger, with a one percent increase in growth rate corresponding to a .73 percent increase 
in the vote for the incumbent. 
 Due to the lack of data and issues of collinearity, the unemployment rate was 
omitted from the regression for Africa and Asia. With regard to Latin America, Appendix 
A demonstrates that the significance of unemployment as a determinant of economic 
voting is strictly limited to presidential elections. Thus, it was determined to omit 
unemployment and simply rely on its application in CEE where a large amount of 
previous scholarship has demonstrated a significant, inverse association between 
unemployment and vote for the incumbent. However, in the CEE model, unemployment 
fails to gain statistical significance and is in the opposite direction.  
 Finally, the inflation rate was employed in the regression models for Latin 
America and Asia context due to the fact that previous literature on Africa and CEE 
largely has failed to find an association between inflation and the economic vote. With 
regard to Latin America, we see that the coefficient for inflation is positively associated 
with the vote for the incumbent and lacks statistical significance. In Asia, inflation is in 
the expected direction but lacks statistical significance. 
Discussion  
Recalling from chapter two and four, the hypothesis for the Latin American 
model suggested the inflation rate would be negatively associated with vote for the 
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incumbent. The results in Table 5.2 do not provide empirical support for the claim that 
inflation is a significant determinant of the vote. Despite the finding for inflation in the 
regional models, it would be improper to simply dismiss the influence of inflation. After 
all, one of the most palpable effects during the Latin Americana debt crisis was 
hyperinflation felt throughout the region. Thus, it is necessary to further investigate the 
nature of the relationship between the macroeconomy and the vote in Latin America.  
Table 5.3: Latin America, 1980 - 1988  
Dependent Variable: Incumbent share of total vote in national assemblies 
Covariate Model 1: Latin America 
  
Vote Lag .64*** 
(.12) 
Growth .63 
(.71) 
Inflation
35
 -.014* 
(.007) 
R-squared 
n-size 
 
.11 
16 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10  
 
Table 5.3 confines the Latin American case study to the years between 1980 and 1988, 
the period in which the debt crisis reached its climax. In the distinct time period, the 
coefficient for inflation is not only significant at the .10 level but is also in the expected 
direction. Thus, for every one percent increase in the inflation rate, the incumbent party 
stood to lose about one one-hundreth of one percent of the vote. When considering the 
fact that hyperinflation in Latin America reached to the thousands of percent in such 
                                                 
35
 Inflation is not lagged due to the fact that the period experienced was a economic crisis, which was 
instantaneously felt by the citizenry. However, when inflation is lagged it no longer becomes significant 
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countries as Argentina and Bolivia, it is clear that inflationary pressures impacted the 
vote for incumbent parliamentary parties – despite the small size of the coefficient. 
Despite the fact that the effect of unemployment on economic voting has been 
clearly established in CEE countries, Table 5.2 notes that unemployment is not a 
statistically significant determinant of the incumbent vote. This is quite unusual given the 
legacy of state-socialism and full employment, and the ascendance of “new regime” 
parties brought harsh economic periods through “shock therapy” that ultimately ushered 
in periods of high unemployment. The failure of the unemployment rate to properly 
predict the incumbent vote may stem from the fact that the prominence of unemployment 
has elapsed. In order words, voters who invoke the nostalgia of full employment and vote 
accordingly are no longer using unemployment cues to cast an economic vote. Does that 
mean that unemployment doesn’t matter to the CEE voter? Unfortunately, the collapse of 
state-socialism which occurred between 1989 and 1992 lacks an admissible sample size 
to properly test for the effects of unemployment. The period from 1989 to 1992 includes 
a sample of four elections in the region and with only two degrees of freedom
36
 the model 
below is highly questionable. Pacek’s (1994) cross-national study on economic voting in 
CEE provides an alternative to understand the role unemployment played from 1990 to 
1992. Paralleling the same time period, Pacek examined the 1990 Polish presidential 
election, 1991 Polish legislative election, 1991 Bulgarian legislative election and the 
1992 Czechoslovakian legislative election using interregional, district-level data so as to 
maximize the N-size. 
 
                                                 
36
 Degrees of freedom are calculated by subtracting the number of covariates from the sample size 
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Table 5.4: Central and Eastern Europe, 1990 – 1992 
Dependent Variable: Incumbent share of total vote in national assemblies 
Covariate Model1: Central and Eastern Europe 
  
Vote Lag -1.72*** 
(.11) 
Unemployment
37
 -19.88*** 
(1.05) 
R-squared 
n-size 
 
.99 
4 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10  
 
 Pacek’s findings suggested that higher unemployment lowered the vote for pro-
reform parties (incumbents). Thus, despite the inability to isolate the effects on 
unemployment during the transition period, Pacek’s district-level analysis of Poland, 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia demonstrated that unemployment is negatively associated 
with vote for the incumbent.  
Two theoretical inferences can be established from the Latin American and CEE 
models. First, both models clearly establish that inflation and unemployment had an 
effect on voter behavior. However, the effect seems to be time dependent. In other words, 
inflation and unemployment seem to matter during the debt crisis and transition to a 
market economy, but both fail to continuously influence the incumbent vote share during 
a longer time series. Second, with respect to the proper nature of lags in economic 
variables, the crisis in both regions demonstrated that lag structures are unable to provide 
an adequate account of the relationship. When measurement of economic voting is 
limited to periods of economic crisis, lagged covariates for inflation and unemployment 
                                                 
37
 Unemployment is not lagged due to the nature of the economic crisis 
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fail to achieve statistical significance. The failure of lags during economic crisis is 
theoretically sound in that most if not all crisis create a sudden change in macroeconomic 
conditions. This is especially true in the case of Latin America and CEE. Inflation in 
Latin America increased in volatile fashion. For example, in Bolivia inflation increased 
from 276 percent (in 1983) to 11, 750 (in 1985), while unemployment in Hungary 
increased from 2.1percent (in 1990) to 11.3 (in 1993). The sudden volatility of 
macroeconomic indicators during periods of crisis means that voters react instantly to 
inflation and/or unemployment.    
Micro-level, Cross-Regional Results 
Next, we examine the micro-level models with data for all regions in the study 
(Tables 5.6-5.8). The fact that the individual-level data involve four measures of 
economic perception requires the assessment of a correlation matrix in order to address 
the degree of possible collinearity. As Table 5.5 demonstrates below, there are significant 
issues of collinearity between retrospective sociotropic and retrospective egotropic, and 
between prospective sociotropic and prospective egotropic. Including covariates for all 
four perceptions of the economy in the model runs the risk of producing estimates that 
are distorted by multicollinearity
38
.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Running only egotropic perceptions the model accurately predicts the relationship between egotropic 
evaluations and vote intention. However, after analyzing the cross-tabulation of egotropic perceptions and 
vote intention it was determined to omit egotropic perception out of the equation. Future studies should 
take caution in modeling egotropic, sociotropic, retrospective, and prospective perceptions as problematic 
multicollinearity may exist.   
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Table 5.5: Micro-level economic voting correlation matrix 
  
The cross-regional micro-level analysis provides three distinct models: (1) cross-
regional economic voting, (2) cross-regional voter heterogeneity and (3) a multi-level 
analysis. Looking at Tables 5.6 and 5.7, one can see that the significance of LR    
suggests that all the coefficients in the model are significantly different from zero. The 
percentage of observations that are correctly predicted averages around sixty percent for 
both models, with percentage of error reduction in the model averaging about nineteen 
percent. 
The coefficients for retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic 
perceptions in Table 5.6 are both statistically significant, across various models, and are 
also in the expected direction
39
. Given the positive coefficients, we can infer that as the 
“degree of wellbeing” increases in retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic 
evaluations, the probability that individuals vote for the incumbent is greater. In other 
words, there’s a positive association between degree of wellbeing in retrospective 
sociotropic and prospective sociotropic economic perceptions and vote intention. In order 
                                                 
39
 In a logit model we are interested in understanding how our covariates impact the probability of getting 1 
or 0, thus the interpretation of coefficients are severely limited to: (1) the direction of the relationship and 
(2) the statistical significance of the relationship. The coefficients fail to explain the magnitude of the 
relationship (See :Golder)  
   EducFinal     0.0750   0.1102   0.0278   0.0690   0.0858   0.0745  -0.2813  -0.2613   1.0000
 AgeCategory    -0.0266  -0.0509  -0.0267  -0.0724   0.0913   0.0116   0.0701   1.0000
      Rural2    -0.0298  -0.0598  -0.0405  -0.0721   0.0109  -0.0748   1.0000
  Ethnicity2     0.0224   0.0103   0.0419   0.0393   0.0238   1.0000
        Sex2     0.0228   0.0177   0.0182   0.0196   1.0000
     ProEgo2     0.2854   0.3427   0.7822   1.0000
   ProSocio2     0.3519   0.3011   1.0000
   RetroEgo2     0.6897   1.0000
 RetroSocio2     1.0000
                                                                                               
               RetroS~2 RetroE~2 ProSoc~2  ProEgo2     Sex2 Ethnic~2   Rural2 AgeCat~y EducFi~l
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to properly interpret the effect of economic perceptions on vote intention and to 
understand whether any particular differences exist between the magnitudes of such 
perceptions, it is necessary to look at the marginal effects, a probabilistic computation. 
The marginal effects are based on the trimmed “sociotropic” model, which omits 
egotropic evaluations, due to collinearity, as discussed previously. 
Looking the marginal effects
40
 in Table 5.6, a one unit increase in the scale of 
retrospective, sociotropic evaluations translates into a .05 increase in the probability for 
vote intention for the incumbent, holding all other covariates at their mean. The marginal 
effects for prospective sociotropic economic well-being are also substantively important. 
The marginal effects indicate that for prospective, sociotropic evaluations, a one unit 
change in the covariate increases the probability of vote for the incumbent by .07.  
The results for the remaining control variables are fairly straightforward.  It is 
important to recall that the covariate for both age and education are catregorized
41
 in the 
model in Table 5.6. The reference category for education is “no education” while for age, 
the reference is “16 – 35.” The coefficient for age suggests that in comparison to the 
reference category, there is a diminishing affect between age and incumbent vote 
intention up to the category for individuals 65 and older (Table 5.6).   
The coefficient for sex (male = 1, 0 = otherwise) suggests that females are more 
likely to vote for the incumbent than males. Specifically, the marginal effects suggest that 
being a male reduces the probability of voting for the incumbent by two percent. With 
                                                 
40
 Marginal effects demonstrates the change in probability given a unit increase in the independent variable 
41
 Education is categorized in the following manner: 0 = no education; 1 = informal schooling (religious 
schooling; 2 = some/complete primary school; 3 = some/complete secondary schooling; 4 = some/complete 
university; 5 = post graduate. Age is categorized in the following manner: 1 = 16-35; 2 = 36-49; 3=50-64; 
4= 65 and above. 
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regard to education, Table 5.6 demonstrates that level of education has only a moderate 
influence on economic voting. The only education coefficients which achieve 
significances are those with university experience and post-graduate education (as well as 
informal education). The marginal effects demonstrate that in comparison to the reference 
category, individuals who have either some or have completed post-secondary education 
reduces the probability of voting for the incumbent by .08.  The marginal effect for those 
who have post-graduate education experience is -.14.  
Voter Heterogeneity in the Developing World  
Despite the fact that past scholarly work has critiqued the use of interaction 
effects within binary response models (Barry and Barry, 1999)
42
, the present thesis 
assumes that the relationship between economic perceptions and intention to vote for the 
incumbent is conditional on socio-demographic variables. In other words, the effect of 
economic perceptions on the probability of intending to vote for the incumbent depends 
on one’s sex, age, and level of education. Table 5.7 presents the results for voter 
heterogeneity. Again with a binary response model, the coefficients provide limited 
inferential capability. Looking at the coefficients in the sociotropic model, one can see 
that all but the multiplicative term between economic perceptions and sex are statistically 
significant. The direction of the interaction terms are in the expected direction. When  
                                                 
42
 The authors essentially note that non-linear models essentially produce interactionary relationships 
between independent variables. 
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Table 5.6: Cross-regional, micro-level economic voting 
Variables     Full model  Sociotropic Model Odds Ratio Marginal Effects 
Retrospective, Sociotropic    .21*** (.01)    .20*** (.01)  1.22*** (.01) .05*** (.00)   
Retrospective, Egotropic    -.03* (.01)       
Prospective, Sociotropic      .30*** (.01)    .29*** (.01)  1.33*** (.01) .07*** (.00) 
Prospective, Egotropic    -.02 (.01)       
Sex      -.07*** (.02)   -.07*** (.02)  .93*** (.02) -.02*** (.01) 
Age Category       
 36 – 49      .09*** (.02)    .09*** (.02)  1.10*** (.03) .02*** (.01) 
 50 – 64      .13*** (.03)    .12*** (.03)  1.13*** (.03) .03*** (.01) 
 65 and above     .07* (.04)    .09** (.04)  1.09** (.04) .02** (.01) 
Education  
 Informal schooling    .14* (.07)    .14* (.07)  1.15* (.09) .03* (.02) 
Some/completed primary school   .04 (.04)    .04 (.04)  1.04 (.04) .01 (.01) 
 Some/completed secondary school   .02 (.03)    .01 (.03)  1.01 (.03) .00 (.01) 
 Some/completed university   -.29*** (.05)  -.31*** (.05)  .73*** (.03) -.08*** (.01) 
 Post-graduate     -.58*** (.22)  -.59*** (.21)  .56*** (.12) -.14*** (.05) 
             
 
N      40, 521   41, 857   41,857  41,857 
Percentage predicted correctly   59.91%   60.03%   60.03%  
Percentage error reduction    18.65%   18.98%   18.98% 
Log Likelihood     -27,045.82  -27,926.70  -27,926.70 
LR         2,074.00***  2,165.37***  2,165.37*** 
Pseudo        .037   .037   .037 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10 
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models include interaction variables, the interpretation of additive terms becomes 
somewhat tricky. Thus, attention is given to multiplicative terms to understand the 
conditional effects. Looking at Table 5.7 we first notice that sex fails to have a significant 
conditional relationship on economics and vote intention. Economic voting at the micro-
level is not conditional on one’s sex. The multiplicative term of education and 
retrospective economic perceptions is not only significant but also in the expected 
direction. The marginal effects are very similar in magnitude across both education and 
age. For all the interaction terms, the marginal effect is .01 
Economic Voting Within a Hierarchical Model 
 Hierarchical modeling of micro-level economic voting is becoming more 
common (for example, see Bratton el al., 2012; Singer and Gelineau, 2012). The purpose 
of a multi-level approach is to “account for variation in a dependent variable that is 
measured at the lowest level of analysis by considering information from multiple levels 
of analysis” (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Steenbergen and Jones (2002) note that a 
multi-level analysis allows the researcher to (1) produce a single comprehensive model, 
(2) explore causal heterogeneity, and (3) increase generalizability of the inferences. 
Hierarchical modeling assumes a nesting process whereby the lowest level of analysis is 
nested within the higher level analysis, and so forth. Thus, multilevel models can take on 
several levels, although two and three-level models are the most common.  
 With the study of economic voting, a multilevel model answers the question as to 
whether support for the incumbent party at the individual-level varies while adjusting for
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Table 5.7: Individual-level Voter Heterogeneity 
Variables       Sociotropic Model  Odds Ratio  Marginal Effects 
Retrospective, Sociotropic        .09** (.04)   1.09** (.04)  .02** (.01)  
Prospective, Sociotropic       .09** (.03)   1.09** (.04)  .02** (.01) 
Sex        -.08*** (.02)   .92*** (.02)  -.02*** (.01) 
Age Category       .04*** (.01)   1.04*** (.01)  .01*** (.00) 
Education Category      -.05*** (.01)   .95*** (.02)  .01*** (.00) 
            
Retrospective, Sociotropic * Age (Categorical)   .02** (.01)   1.02** (.01)  .01** (.00) 
Prospective, Sociotropic * Age (Categorical)   .03*** (.01)   1.03*** (.01)  .01*** (.00) 
Retrospective, Sociotropic * Education (Categorical)   .03*** (.01)   1.03*** (.01)  .01*** (.00) 
Prospective, Sociotropic * Education (Categorical)   .06*** (.01)   1.06*** (.01)  .01*** (.00) 
Retrospective, Sociotropic * Sex (Categorical)   .01 (.02)    1.01 (.02)  .00 (.01) 
Prospective, Sociotropic * Sex (Categorical)    .02 (.02)    1.02 (.02)  .00 (.00) 
 
 
N        41,857    41,857   41,857 
Percentage predicted correctly     59.98    59.98 
Percentage error reduction      18.88%    18.88% 
Log Likelihood       -27,928.09   -27,928.09 
LR           2,162.53***   2,162.53*** 
Pseudo          .04     .04 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
  
 
9
9 
Table 5.8: Multi-level Economic Voting 
Variables      Sociotropic Model  Odds Ratio  Growth Model    
Retrospective, Sociotropic     .18*** (.01)   1.19*** (.01)      
Prospective, Sociotropic      .24*** (.01)   1.27*** (.01)  
Sex       -.07*** (.01)   .93*** (.02) 
Age Category 
 36-49      .05* (.03)   1.05* (.03) 
 50-64      .05 (.03)    1.05 (.03) 
 65 and above     -.05 (.04)   .96 (.04) 
Education 
 Informal schooling      .09 (.09)   1.09 (.09) 
Some/completed primary school     -.03 (.04)   .97 (.04) 
 Some/completed secondary school     -.19*** (.04)   .83*** (.03) 
 Some/completed university     -.36*** (.05)   .70*** (.04) 
 Post-graduate      -1.37*** (.22)   .25*** (.06) 
       
Level-Two  (random intercept estimates)      
 Growth Rate     .26 (.04)
43
      1.44 (.20) 
 Inflation      .17 (.05)
 44
    
 Unemployment     .27 (.05) 
45
         
 
         
N       41,857    41,857   41,857 
Percentage predicted correctly      
Percentage error reduction     19.94% 
Log Likelihood      -24,717.64 
Wald          1,126.21***  
LR Chi2       6,445.30***    
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
                                                 
43
 Variance components for the random intercept 
44
 Variance components for the random intercept 
45
 Variance components for the random intercept 
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an aggregate
46
 or macro-level influence. Table 5.8 shows the results for the hierarchical 
model for the full world-wide model. The multi-level model behaves in the predicted 
manner as evidenced by two statistical outputs. First, we can infer that the multi-level 
model provides a better fit than a single-level logistic regression model. This is evident 
by significance of the LR test. Second, using the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) 
we can infer whether our model violates the assumption that our predictors are 
uncorrelated with any random component. Looking at the ICC, we see that country 
random effects parameter comprises approximately thirty-three percent of the total 
residual variance. A high interclass correlation coefficient translates into a greater 
likelihood that the variation in the sample occurs in the higher level (Baumlet et al. 2003: 
125).  
 Having demonstrated that a multi-level analysis provides a “better” approach 
towards understanding micro-level economic voting, we next move to examination of the 
results for specific covariates in the model. It is not surprising to see that the coefficients 
for both retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic perceptions are statistically 
significant and in the expected direction, after adjusting for level-2 (country-level) effects 
of growth, inflation and unemployment. Looking at the odds ratio, we see a similar 
pattern of prospective sociotropic evaluations have stringer effects in magnitude 
compared to retrospective sociotropic evaluations. 
 The control variables perform as in previous models. The coefficient for sex is 
negatively associated with incumbent vote intention and retains its statistical significance, 
                                                 
46
 In a multi-level mixed effected model, the level one covariates along with the constant term are the fixed 
effects and at level two we specify the random effects. 
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suggesting that males are less likely to vote for incumbents. The relationship between age 
and vote intention is only statistically significant for voters who are between the ages of 
thirty-six and forty-nine. Finally, education too behaves in the manner demonstrated 
previously. As an individual level of education increases, he or she becomes less likely to 
intend to vote for the incumbent. 
Region-Specific Results 
 Region-specific models allow us to provide political controls in order to better 
understand how economic perceptions affect vote intention. The likelihood ratio for the 
model chi-square suggests that both the Latin American and African models are 
significant. Africa also has a very high percentage of observations that are correctly 
predicted, measuring at 95.3 percent. The percentage of error reduction in the Africa 
model is approximately 88.8 percent. The error reduction for the Latin America model is 
15.4%.  
 The coefficients for retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic 
evaluations continue to remain statistically significant and in the expected direction in 
both models (Tables 5.9 and 5.10). For Latin American voters, the marginal effect for 
retrospective sociotropic evaluations shows that a one unit change in the scale increases 
the probability of voting for the incumbent by .06. The marginal effect for this covariate 
in the Africa model is .03, suggesting that the influence of retrospective sociotropic 
evaluations is stronger in Latin America in comparison to the African sample. 
 Looking at prospective sociotropic evaluations, we see that they are higher in 
magnitude than retrospective sociotropic evaluations for both African and Latin 
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American voters. Here too we see that the marginal effects are larger in the Latin 
American sample (.08) than for African voters (.05). In short, the relationship between 
economic evaluations and incumbent vote intention are stronger in magnitude within the 
Latin American electorate than the African electorate. 
 The socio-demographic control variables illustrate further differences between 
African and Latin American voters. First, while Latin American men are less likely to 
support the incumbent party, the coefficient for sex in the African model fails to achieve 
statistical significance. Second, while age in the Latin American model is not significant, 
in the Africa model older respondents are more likely to intend to vote for the incumbent. 
Finally, education provides another difference between African and Latin American 
voters. Latin American respondents with university experience are less likely to intend to 
vote for the incumbent. In the Africa model, education fails to achieve statistical 
significance.  
 Despite the fact that the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer lack a common item 
to measure political allegiance, partisan identification and ideology are measurable 
proxies to provide an understanding of how political controls affect incumbent vote 
intention.  In the Latin American context, right-wing ideology is inversely associated 
with vote intention. Specifically for each unit change towards the right, the odds of 
intending to vote for the incumbent decreases by one-tenth of one percent.  
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Table 5.9: Micro-level Latin American economic voting 
Variables      Sociotropic Model  Odds Ratio  Marginal Effect 
Retrospective, Sociotropic     .23*** (.02)   1.26*** (.02)  .06*** (.00)    
Prospective, Sociotropic      .31*** (.02)    1.36*** (.02)  .08*** (.00)    
Sex       -.06** (.03)   .94** (.03)  -.02** (.01) 
Age Category       
 36 – 49      .03 (.03)    1.03 (.04)    .01 (.01) 
 50 – 64      .04 (.04)     1.04 (.04)  .01 (.01) 
 65 and above     .02 (.05)    1.02 (.04)  .004 (.01) 
Education  
Some/completed primary school    -.05 (.06)   .95 (.05)   -.01 (.01) 
 Some/completed secondary school   -.002 (.05)   .998 (.05)  -.001 (.01) 
 Some/completed university   -.29*** (.06)   .75*** (.05)  -.07*** (.02) 
        
Ideology      -.002*** (.00)   .998*** (.00)  .001*** (.00) 
  
 
N       21, 114    21, 114   21, 114 
Percentage predicted correctly    61.51%    61.51% 
Percentage error reduction     15.36%    15.36% 
Log Likelihood      -13,930.054   -13,930.054 
LR          1,237.09***   1,237.09*** 
Pseudo         .04    .04 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10 
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Table 5.10: Micro-level African economic voting 
Variables      Sociotropic Model  Odds Ratio  Marginal Effect 
Retrospective, Sociotropic     .15*** (.04)   1.16*** (.05)  .03*** (.01)      
  
Prospective, Sociotropic     .21*** (.04)     1.24*** (.05)  .05*** (.01)   
    
Sex       .02 (.08)    1.02 (.09)  .005 (.02)  
Age Category       
 36 – 49      .18* (.10)   1.20* (.12)    .04* (.02) 
 50 – 64      .20 (.13)     1.22   (.16)  .05 (.03) 
 65 and above     .31* (.18)   1.36* (.24)  .07* (.04) 
Education  
Informal schooling     .20 (.22)   1.22 (.27)  .04 (.05) 
Some/completed primary school    .08 (.13)   1.08 (.15)  .02 (.03) 
 Some/completed secondary school    .08 (.14)   1.08 (.15)  .02 (.03) 
 Some/completed university    .07 (.26)   1.08 (.28)  .02 (.06) 
 Post-graduate     -.60 (.60)   .55 (.33)   -.15 (.15) 
 
Ethnicity      .12*** (.04)   1.13*** (.04)  .03*** (.01) 
Rural       .01 (.09)    1.01   .003 (.02) 
Party ID       5.97*** (.08)   390.84*** (32.65) 1.35*** (.02)  
                   
 
N       13,313    13, 313   13, 313 
Percentage predicted correctly    95.30%    95.30% 
Percentage error reduction     88.75%    88.75% 
Log Likelihood      -2,473.9906   -2,473.9906 
LR          13,148.18***   13,148.18*** 
Pseudo         .73    .73 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
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The African model includes a greater number of controls, including ethnicity, rural 
setting and political identification. With regard to ethnic saliency, we see that the 
coefficient is statistically significant in the expected direction. The positive association 
between ethnic saliency and incumbent vote intention signals that respondents who 
consider themselves primarily and completely within their national identity as more 
likely to intend to vote for the incumbent than those individuals who identify solely or 
primarily with their ethnic group. Looking at the marginal effects, we see that identifying 
with one’s national identity increases the probability of intending to vote for the 
incumbent by three percentage points. The coefficient for rural setting, fails to reach 
statistical significance. This suggests that residing in a rural area had no influence on 
likelihood of intending to vote for the incumbent. 
Finally, the results suggest that partisan identification has a large effect on vote 
intention. The covariate for partisan identification is positively associated with vote 
intention and is statistically significant at the .01 level. The positive association means 
that individuals associated with the incumbent party were more likely to intend to vote 
for that party in comparison to respondents affiliated with other parties. Looking at the 
marginal effect, we see that moving from the nonincumbent to incumbent party (i.e. a 
change from 0 to 1) increases the probability of intending to vote for the incumbent by 
1.35, a very large effect.   Relatively speaking, the marginal effects are the largest in the 
present study, suggesting that party identification in Africa is clearly the prominent voter 
determinant. 
Discussion   
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In the previous section, the various micro-level models demonstrated that 
prospective sociotropic economic perceptions have a stronger effect than retrospective 
sociotropic perceptions. Why is that so? Previous research on the relationship between 
retrospective and prospective economic perceptions has demonstrated that they are linked 
to the incumbency-status of a party (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001; Singer and Carlin, 
2013). If the incumbent party either lacks a proper time horizon, or if the candidate is not 
running for reelection then the voters, in the absence of information (governing record), 
tend to be prospective. However, if the incumbent party has accumulated a large amount 
of time in office, then voters tend to be retrospective. The fact that the marginal effects 
for the prospective tendencies are larger than retrospective ones is in line with the 
literature on political parties in the developing world, which demonstrate their volatile 
nature in terms of platforms and durability. 
In Table 5.7 it was noted that socio-demographic variables cast a mediating affect 
between economic perceptions and vote intention. The presence of voter heterogeneity in 
the developing world is in line with prior works (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Singer and 
Gelineau, 2010). Within Latin America and Africa, economic voter heterogeneity implies 
that age and education have a positive conditional impact on the relationship between 
economic perceptions and vote intention. Specifically, those who are elderly and with 
higher levels of education are more likely to vote for the incumbent based on a positive 
retrospective sociotropic, and prospective sociotropic, assessment of economic wellbeing.  
The fact that more educated voters are more likely to engage in economic voting 
signals that economic voting in the developing world is dependent upon level of 
education. In order to properly associate one’s vote with sociotropic perceptions, one 
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must possess knowledge of conditions in the local or national economy. Thus, if an 
individual lacks the proper educational tools then basing vote intention off of sociotropic 
perceptions becomes ever more difficult. Interestingly, when the level of education is not 
interacted with economic perceptions, we see a negative association between education 
and vote intention. Why is this so? One explanation is that individuals that lack proper 
educational tools also have lower income. Furthermore, lacking a durable means of 
income makes individuals more susceptible to form of patronage. If voting for the 
incumbent is due to patronage then those with higher education will be less likely to vote 
for incumbent as their economic needs are more likely satisfied than those without proper 
forms of education. In short, those who are more educated are less likely to vote for the 
incumbent, but when education is interacted with economic perceptions, the educated are 
more likely to base their intention to vote on economic perceptions. 
Aside from education, age also has a mediating effect on the economic vote. An 
explanation of the mediating effect of age can be based on the fact that the developing 
world often lacks a functioning social safety net. As noted previously, the lack of social 
safety nets was one of the factors that might produce greater effects of economic voting. 
Indeed, the mediating effect of age and economic perceptions can be the result of the fact 
that a lack of social safety nets causes individuals to increasingly base their vote on 
economics as they age. In a country without proper social safety nets, the elderly become 
the most economically vulnerable citizens. Thus, we can expect the elderly to 
increasingly rely on economics as a source of voting behavior.   
 In the Latin American context, the negative association between ideology (when 
higher scores are associated with right self-placement) and vote intention implies that an 
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individual who identifies himself or herself with the “left” is more likely to vote for the 
incumbent. This is of little surprise given the abundance of “left” leaning incumbents in 
Latin America 
 In the African context, ethnic saliency is negatively associated with vote 
intention. This is not surprising as Bratton et al. (2012) found that ethnic saliency was 
negatively associated with intention to vote for the ruling party. Respondents who 
identified themselves primarily in ethnic heuristics were less likely to vote for the 
incumbent. Table 5.10 confirms Bratton et al.’s results with a positive association 
between national self-identity and vote for the incumbent. Specifically, the change in 
probability for intention to vote for one unit change in ethnic saliency is three percentage 
points.  
 Perhaps the most unusual result of African economic voting models is the 
association between party identification and the vote. The lack of a durable party system 
in developing countries have been noted by scholars as a reason to approach the study of 
voting behavior in a different theoretical perspective. However, in the African context we 
see that party identification is a strong predictor of vote intention. Although the model 
includes only two survey waves (2005 and 2008), the results demonstrate that political 
affiliation is the leading predictor of the vote. A correlation matrix (not shown here) 
demonstrates a correlation effect of .90 between vote and party identification. The 
strength of party ID is also exemplified in a large McFadden’s pseudo R-squared of .73. 
 Overall, the micro-level methodological framework provides a breadth of 
information on individual economic voting behavioral traits. Cross-regionally, voters 
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place more emphasis on prospective sociotropic evaluations than retrospective ones. In 
the developing world, economic voter behavior is heterogeneous with age and education 
contributing to higher levels of the economic vote. The inclusion of a hierarchical model 
provides evidence that the modeling of individual-level economic voting should take 
place within a multi-level model, accounting for level-two – aggregate – indicators. 
Region-specific models allows for the inclusion of political controls which then allow for 
a much proper understanding of the economic motives in voter behavior. Political 
preference controls behave in the expected manner and in Africa is a prominent predictor 
of the vote. In short, the models demonstrate that economic voting takes place in Latin 
America and Africa, with an emphasis on prospective sociotropic perceptions.    
Asymmetry of Voting  
 Do voters punish incumbent for economic downturns and reward incumbents for 
a prosperous economy? Table 5.11 demonstrates that voters do, in fact, punish 
incumbents for economic regressions and reward for economic progressions. The 
coefficients for bad economic times are negatively associated with incumbent vote 
intention, demonstrating the punishment mechanism of economic voting. The coefficients 
for good economic times are positively associated with incumbent vote intention, 
demonstrating the reward mechanism of economic voting.   
While the results provide evidence for a reward-punishment approach to 
economic voting, the magnitude and probability of punishment and reward differs. We 
see when voters assess the economy retrospective they tend to place more weight on 
punishment than reward. Thus, voters are more critical of the economy in retrospective 
fashion. The marginal effect for retrospective-good translates into a .05 increase in the 
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probability of voting for the incumbent. But the change in probability for the intention to 
vote for the incumbent under a regressing economy is negative eight percentage points. 
Thus, the probability of punishment under what is perceived as a bad economy is almost 
double than reward under a good economy. In short, retrospective voters tend to exhibit a 
negativity bias. 
Table 5.11: Asymmetry of Voting 
Dependent Variable: Incumbent share of total vote in national assemblies 
Covariate Coefficients Marginal Effects 
   
Retrospective-Sociotropic 
Good 
.21*** 
(.03) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
Retrospective-Sociotropic Bad -.33*** 
(.03) 
-.08*** 
(.01) 
Prospective-Soctiotropic 
Good 
.51***  
(.03) 
.13*** 
(.01) 
Prospective-Sociotropic Bad -.26***  
(.03) 
-.07*** 
(.01) 
n-size 
Percentage predicted correctly 
Percentage error reduction 
Log Likelihood 
LR    
Pseudo R-squared 
 
42,038 
59.73% 
18.39% 
-28,065.964 
2,137.97*** 
.04 
42,038 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10   
 
A prospective economic outlook provides varying results. When voters assess the 
economy prospectively, they tend to reward more than punishment. Looking at the 
margin effect, we see that change in probability for intention to vote for the incumbent 
under an improving economic is thirteen percentage points. But the change in probability 
for the intention to vote for the incumbent under a regressing economy is negative seven 
percentage points. Prospective voter seem to be demonstrated a case of positivity bias.  
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The results parallel works on asymmetry of behavior. While there is a clear 
skewness of scholarship demonstrating a negativity bias, the scope with which such 
experiments take place are either hypothetical or retrospective. People tend to place more 
weight on negative events, but individuals also demonstrate optimism for the future.  
Conclusion  
The present chapter demonstrated that economic voting in developing countries 
exists both at the macro and micro-level. The incumbency does pay a price or reap the 
benefits of macroeconomic fluctuations. The study also found that in macro-level models, 
growth is a prominent determinant of the economic vote. The influence of inflation and 
unemployment, while present, is strictly time dependent. Within regional economic 
voting, the significance of growth rate varied and was not present in Africa. These two 
findings add to the wider account of economic voting as being unstable and specific to 
certain time periods.  
With regard to micro-level economic voting, the chapter confirms the saliency of 
retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic evaluations. With regard to CEVT 
hypotheses, while the presence of retrospective sociotropic evaluations is confirmed in 
developing countries, voters tend to also demonstrate prospective sociotropic evaluations, 
in greater magnitude. This may be primarily due to the fact that incumbent parties are 
constantly being reformed, rebranded and replaced, created a prospective-oriented 
electorate. The micro-level study also demonstrates that voters are heterogeneous in their 
support for the incumbent. 
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Economic voting in the developing world differs in magnitude. The last part of 
the chapter demonstrated that voters tend engage in negativity bias when evaluating the 
economy retrospectively. However, in prospective evaluations, voters exhibited a 
positivity bias. Relying on the study of social psychology puts the results in perspective. 
While there is a plethora of studies that show individuals place greater weight on negative 
(as opposed to positive) information and events, people also tend to be positive-minded, 
or optimistic, about prospective events. Individuals tend to retrospectively remember bad 
events than good events. Thus, voters too place greater emphasis on negative economic 
events than positive ones. However, voters also demonstrate positive-mindedness about 
future economic prospects.   
Unfortunately, prospect theory only partially explains the asymmetry of voting in 
the developing world. While its cost-oriented assumption accurately predicts 
retrospective voting behavior, it is unable to explain the positivity bias associated with 
prospective voting. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 The application of economic voting in the form of CEVT has produced a great 
deal of scholarship that supports the theory in various developed countries. Indeed, the 
issue of whether economic cognitive heuristics are part of the vote function in developed 
states is considered a settled research debate within the study of comparative politics. 
Voters, for the most part, act in typical CEVT-oriented fashion, in that they assume a 
retrospective sociotropic-orientation, are incumbent-oriented in their vote, engage in a 
punishment-reward calculus of the incumbent and dish out reward and punishment in an 
even-handed manner. Voters in developed countries tend to also demonstrate symptoms 
of “withdrawal” in voter turnout during epochs of economic downturns (Radcliff, 1992). 
Despite the overwhelming evidence, economic voting in developed countries varies 
significantly across national contexts and over time (Duch and Stevenson, 2006). Such 
variation has been primarily attributed to varying political systems between countries. 
Summary of the Findings 
 The present thesis demonstrated theoretically and empirically that voters in 
developing countries partially diverge from the CEVT type of voting behavior. Voters in 
developing countries have demonstrated greater dynamism in their perceptions of the 
economy, a pattern which challenges the current theory. Chapter two outlined the varying 
economic perceptions voters undertake in their assessment of the incumbent. While 
voters in developed countries are said to be of retrospective and sociotropic type, voting 
behavior in developing countries is much more mixed, with prospective economic voting 
being a formidable method of economic evaluations. The hypotheses tested derived from 
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CEVT were partially applicable to developing countries in that voters were sociotropic 
agents. However, voters in developing countries are displayed prospective characteristics, 
and with greater magnitude in probabilistic outcomes.  
Furthermore the underlying theoretical logic of CEVT – utility expectations 
theory (UET) – presupposes an “absolute” maximization of individual utility. The notion 
of decision-making under an “absolutist” framework has been criticized by such 
behavioral economists as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann (1979), who 
demonstrate that individual decision-making is marked by “relative” gains and losses in 
utility. As such, from a theoretical standpoint, the findings called into question the 
application of UET in economic voting behavior, noting that behavior in the voting booth 
– the intuition to punish or reward the incumbent – is perhaps more accurately interpreted 
by the relativist, cost-oriented assumption of prospect theory than by notion of absolute 
utility maximization.  
 Methodologically, the thesis presented a mixed approach to the study of economic 
voting. Indeed, in order to properly assess the impact of economics on elections, a 
combination of macro and micro-level frameworks are required in order to gain a 
“complete” understanding of the impact of economics, both at the state-level and at the 
individual-level. In order to avoid the pitfall of ecological fallacy, it was determined to 
approach the issue of voter asymmetry solely from a micro standpoint. Finally, a cross-
level methodological framework was instituted so as to understand the relationship 
between individual-level and state-level economic predictors of the vote. 
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 Empirically, the thesis provided several underlying elements of economic voting 
in the developing world. First, both macro and micro-level regression models 
demonstrated a relationship between economics and the vote. At the macro-level, the 
growth rate served a paramount indicator of economic voting behavior, triumphing 
inflation and unemployment. The significance of growth rate in a cross-regional analysis 
was also noted by Wilkin et al. (1997) in their cross-sectional assessment of economic 
voting in a world-wide sample
47
. Second, while inflation was also a predictor of the 
economic vote, its significance was time-specific. In other words, inflation seemed to 
matter during periods of economic crisis. 
 At the micro-level, voters in developing countries parallel themselves with their 
counterparts in developed countries by assessing economic perceptions in sociotropic 
fashion. However, voters diverge from CEVT by reacting in both a retrospective and 
prospective fashion, though the marginal effect of the latter seems to be higher than the 
former both cross-regionally and within Latin America and Africa. While lack of a 
comparable indicator for political affiliation prevents me from controlling for politics at 
the cross-regional level, political preferences in the form of ideology or party 
identification provide significant controls of voting behavior, especially within the 
African region, where party ID seems to be the dominant predictor of the vote. The 
significance of political affiliations in Africa and Latin America calls into question the 
perspective that party identification lacks significance in the developing world. Although 
the present study demonstrated the significance of political affiliation, the source of such 
                                                 
47
 Wilkin et al. (1997) used a cross-sectional observation on thirty-eight countries. They avoided pooled 
country elections due to the fact that a time sequence results in the issue of autocorrelation. Thus, the 
authors relied on one election per country to avoid cases of serial correlation. 
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affiliation (whether it’s platform-based or patronage-based) is in question and beyond the 
scope of the thesis.   
 Fourth, voters in developing countries behave in a heterogeneous fashion. Voter 
heterogeneity in economic voting has been affirmed in prior works on developing 
countries (e.g.  Duch, 2001; Singer & Gelineau, 2010). The present thesis has 
demonstrated that elder and more educated voters tend to rely more on economic 
perception-based heuristics when assessing their intention to vote for the incumbent. 
 Finally, while voters do reward and punish the incumbent for economic prosperity 
and downturns, the magnitude of the punishment and reward is asymmetrical. Voter 
behavior in asymmetrical fashion has been documented in both retrospective and 
prospective. Specifically, when voters assess the economy in a retrospective manner, they 
tend to assign greater magnitudes of punishment than reward. This may be attributable to 
the fact that individuals tend to place greater negative weight to events in the immediate 
past. Individuals tend to recall negative events at a more frequent pace than positive 
events. In the political economy realm, it is probable to assume that voters will more 
readily recall negative retrospective economic event than a positive. However, when 
assessing the role of the economy prospectively, voters tend to be more positively-
oriented, in that they assign greater magnitude of reward than punishment. This may be 
due to the fact that voters tend to optimistic about the future.     
 This thesis demonstrated that the choice theory-inspired CEVT is ill-equipped at 
providing a theoretical setting in the developing country context. Voters not only place 
emphasis on prospective perceptions in greater magnitudes, but also exhibit patterns of 
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voter asymmetry. Those patterns vary when assessment of the economy occurs in 
retrospective fashion than in prospective fashion. Retrospectively, voters engage in 
negativity bias, while prospectively they assume traits of positivity bias. 
 While prospect theory provides a more complete understanding of economic 
voting than its counterpart, its limitation is its inability to explain the positive bias of 
voters when assessing the economy prospectively.     
Limitations of the Study 
 The following thesis attempted to provide a comprehensive account of economic 
voting in the developing world. In doing so, the paper overlooked several key issues that 
merit further empirical study including endogeneity, assessment of party coalitions 
heterogeneously and the influence of the media. All these issues have not been addressed 
much in studies of developed countries, much less in developing countries. In assuming 
that economic perceptions are predictors of voting behavior, research has overlooked as 
to how individual perceptions are formed, and whether they are influenced by the media. 
In developed countries, the scarce amount of literature that has tackled the issue of media 
effects in economic voting has failed to reach a consensus on the impact of media on 
economic perceptions. Of the extent works, many have concentrated on popularity 
functions. While evidence that the media mediates the economic vote has been 
demonstrated in the 1992 U.S. presidential election (Edwards III et al., 1995; 
Hetherington, 1996), other works have demonstrated mixed results in the issue of the 
mediation of the media (Malhotra and Krosnick, 2007). 
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 Concentration on the effects of the media can improve understanding of the 
relationship between economics and the vote. Media networks tend to give greater news 
coverage towards negative economic news during non-elections years (Harrington, 
1989). If negative economic news events dominate the airwaves, then the individuals who 
obtain their information of the economy through media outlets are more likely to 
remember and recall negative economic events over positive ones, thus impacting their 
economic vote.  
 In the developing world, the empirical assessment of the media’s role in the 
economic vote is more complex. It is not surprising to find media outlets in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia dominated by incumbent-aligned oligarchs whose control of 
economic information is heavily skewed towards positive-based news. Thus, it is much 
more difficult to find an “impartial spectator” news outlet that can provide objective 
economic news reels.     
 In addition, the current thesis’ treatment of party coalitions as a monolithic group 
is an oversimplification. Although differentiation of coalition members (e.g. primary 
coalition party v. other coalition parties) is beyond the scope of the research, it is vital to 
point out that literature in the field has established the fact that the economic vote is not 
distributed to coalition members in equal fashion (Tucker, 2001; Akarca and Tansel, 
2007). Voters seem to target primary coalition members, or the largest party within an 
incumbent coalition, while failing to equally assess responsibility to secondary members.  
 Likewise, the analysis in chapter 5 assumes that the arrow of causality flows from 
economic perceptions to political behavior. This, however, is a contentious point in 
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economic voting research. Previous studies have suggested that economic perceptions are 
endogenous to partisan ideology. Thus, a Republican voter will present a subjective, 
biased and different interpretation of the economy when there is a Democratic 
administration, then when a Republican is president. Such evidence casts a paralyzing 
effect on the inferential capability of economic voting. The verdict is still out on the 
arrow of causality between economics and political behavior. 
 Finally, the thesis may not have adequately controlled for the institutional context 
at the macro-level. In chapter 3, I described how literature has shown that a proper cross-
national study at the macro-level needs to adjust for institutional differences, referred to 
in the literature as “clarity of responsibility.” The current aim of the thesis was to test 
CEVT within the developing world. Unfortunately, timeliness did not allow for proper 
controls of the institutional differences. However, subsequent research on the 
applicability of the clarity of responsibility thesis within the developing world will 
provide greater depth on institutional differences between developing countries.  
What We Know and Where Do We Go From Here  
 Since 1970 the study of economic voting has evolved into one of the most 
voluminous research areas within disciplines of comparative political economy and voter 
behavior. The prominence of the research agenda stems from the fact that economic 
volatility – which has occurred more frequently – is a potentially influential determinant 
of the vote. Furthermore, economic indicators such as inflation, unemployment and 
economic growth have been found to be a consistent influence of voting in comparison to 
other determinants. As noted by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), the volatility of 
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economic factors creates a greater likelihood that the demise of a particular government 
comes from economic factors rather than party realignments. Although economic voting 
in mature democracies is all but settled, the relationship economics and elections in the 
developing world is still in its scholarly infancy. 
 With respect to mature democracies, scholarship has produced various inferential 
conclusions about economic voting. First, as noted, economic voting has been 
demonstrated throughout both single-country and cross-national studies. Second, despite 
the overwhelming evidence of economic voting within various countries, the economic 
voting function is inherently unstable within individuals, countries, and time periods. In 
other words, its degree of importance varies significantly among individuals, time periods 
and countries. Third, economic voters are heterogeneous voters.  
Despite the fact that research in mature democracies is all but settled, future 
scholarship can concentrate on the significance of regionalism on the economic vote. 
Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) provided us with an exceptional starting point in modeling 
the influence of EU-ization on national economic evaluations. The authors found that 
when voters analyzed the EU as the responsible party for economic policy within a 
country, they were less likely to tie economics to the vote. Will the growth of regionalism 
threaten the durability of the economic vote function?  At present, this remains an open 
question.  
 The current thesis contributed to the study of economic voting in the following 
manner. Theoretically, it casts doubt in the applicability of choice theory in the study of 
economic voting, showing through an analysis of developing countries that prospect 
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theory provides a more convincing theoretical account of asymmetrical voting. 
Methodologically, it shows that subsequent micro-level studies must either take place 
within a hierarchical model or control for the possibility variances between different 
levels of measurement. Empirically, the findings demonstrated that the developed 
country-inspired CEVT is not fully applicable to the developing country context. In fact, 
voters in developing countries not only exhibit prospective evaluations, they also behave 
in asymmetric fashion. The thesis concludes with a call for future research to address 
some of the limitations noted above.
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Single-Country Studies in Latin America 
Author(s) Country Time 
Period 
Sample 
n-size 
Methodology President/ 
Parties 
Significant 
Economic 
Variables 
Stokes, 1996 Peru 1990-95 41 (p46) Micro-level Fujimori Inflation 
Weyland, 2000 Peru 1992-97 24 Macro-level Fujimori Growth 
Arce, 2003 Peru 1985-1997 147 (Garcia=59; 
Fujimori = 88) 
 
Micro-level Garcia, Fujimori Inflation & 
Unemployment 
Kelly, 2003 Peru 1991-2000 100 Micro-level Fujimori Prospective 
Weyland, 1998 Venezuela 1989-1993 1500 Micro-level Perez Prospective, 
Pocketbook 
Weyland, 2003 Venezuela 1998 847 Micro-level Chavez Prospective, 
Sociotropic 
Nadeua et al., 2013 Venezuela 2010 612 Micro-level Chavez Retrospective 
Brophy-Baermann, 1994 Mexico 1946-1988 8 Macro-level Leftist parties Inflation & 
Income 
Buendia, 1996 Mexico 1988-1993 3,500 
2,500 
2,000 
Micro-level Salinas Inflation & 
Unemployment 
Dominguez & McCann, 
1995 
Mexico 1988-1991 1988: 1,426 
1991: 1,766 
Micro-level PRI, PAN Prospective, 
pocketbook 
Germano, 2013 Mexico  767 Micro-level Vote participation - 
Canton & Jorrat, 2002 Argentina 1995-1999 1995: 246 
1999: 906 
Micro-level Menem (PJ) Retrospective, 
sociotropic 
Remmer & Gelineau, 
2003 
Argentina 1983-1989 Prov. Gov: 86 
Prov. Dep: 106 
Nat. Dep: 174 
Macro-level incumbent Inflation 
Anderson et al., 2003 Nicaragua 1990 3841 Micro-level Incumbent Retrospective (++) 
and prospective 
(+) 
Panzer and Paredes, 
1991 
Chile 1988 24 Macro-level Presidential 
Referendum 
Unemployment 
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Cross-National Studies in Latin America 
Author(s) Country Time Sample n-size Methodology SEV
48
 
Remmer, 1991 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rice, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
1982-
1990 
21 presidential 
elections 
Macro-level Inflation, exchange 
rate 
Roberts & Wibbels, 
1999 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rice, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
1980-
1997 
101 (58 legislative 
elections; 43 
presidential 
elections) 
Macro-level Growth rate 
Benton, 2005 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rice, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
1988-
2003 
39 presidential 
elections 
Macro-level GDP per capita 
Johnson & Schwindt  
Bayer, 2009 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama 
1979-
2007 
338 observations Micro-level Inflation 
Johnson & Ryu, 
2010 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rice, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
1980-
2006 
96 presidential 
elections 
Macro-level Inflation, growth rate 
Singer & Gelineau, 
2010 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rice, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
1995-
2005 
162 country years 
104,435 sample 
size 
Micro-level GDP Growth 
Lewis-Beck & 
Ratto, 2013 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
1996, 
2000, 
2004 
7792, 7591, 7520 Micro-level Retrospective, 
sociotropic 
Singer & Carlin, 
2013 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rice, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
1995 – 
2009 
152, 630 Micro-level SR, SP, ER, EP
49
; 
Context matters 
    
                                                 
48
 Significant economic variables 
49
 SR: Sociotropic Retrospective; SP: Sociotropic Prospective; ER: Egotropic Retrospective; EP: Egotropic Prospective 
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Single-Country Studies in Central and Eastern Europe 
Author(s) Country Time 
Period 
Sample 
n-size 
Methodology President/ 
elections/ 
Parties 
Theoretically and 
Methodologically 
Significant 
Economic Variables 
Colton, 1996 Russia 1995 2800 Micro-level Parliamentary Sociotropic, 
unemployment 
Warner, 2001 Russia 1995 72 Macro-level Reform parties - 
Hesli & Bashkirova, 2001 Russia 1991-1997 10812 Micro-level Yeltsin Prospective, 
pocketbook 
Mishler & Willerton, 
2003 
Russia 1991-2001 114 Micro-level Yeltsin,Putin Retrospective, 
inflation 
Konitzer-Smirnov, 2003 Russia 1996-1997 
2001-2001 
35 
31 
Macro-level Oblast elections Real Wages and Real 
Pensions 
Richter, 2006 Russia 1996 1122 Micro-level Yeltsin Wage Arrears 
(pocketbook) 
Wade et al., 1993 Poland 1991 37 Marco-level Parliamentary Unemployment 
Gibson & Cielecka, 1995 Poland 1993 49 Macro-level Parliamentary Unemployment 
Wade et al., 1995 Poland 1993 49 Macro-level Parliamentary - 
Przeworski, 1996 Poland 1989-1991 20 Macro-level Reform Plan Unemployment 
Bell, 1997 Poland 1990-1995 49 Macro-level 2 pres./ 2 parl. 
Elections 
Unemployment, 
Income 
Powers & Cox, 1997 Poland 1993 1702 Micro-level Parliamentary - 
Bielasiak & Blunck, 2002 Poland 1993 854 Micro-level Parliamentary Pocketbook 
Owen & Tucker, 2010 Poland 1997, 2001, 
2005 
1006 Micro-level Parliamentary Retrospective 
Anderson et al., 2003 Hungary 1994 700 Micro-level Parliamentary Retrospective (++), 
prospective (+) 
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2009 
Hungary 1998-2010 1998: 26 
2010: 28 
Macro-level 
Micro-level 
Socialist (MSZP) 
Party 
Unemployment 
Lippenyi et al., 2013 Hungary 1998-2008 52503 Micro-level Parliamentary Retrospective, 
Prospective; 
Educated voters tend 
to be pocketbook 
Coffey, 2013 Czech 
Republic 
1995-2008 168 Macro-level Parliamentary Unemployment, 
wages 
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 “Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries” 
51
 “Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in Transition Countries” 
52
 In Lithuania (1992), voters were both retrospective pocketbook and prospective pocketbook (although coefficient for the former was higher). Hungarian 
regression failed to achieve significance and Bulgarian voters were prospective pocketbook (retrospective pocketbook was significant but in the wrong sign). 
Interestingly, unemployment failed to gain statistical significance but for the post part was in the predicted direction. Aside from Lithuania 1992, sociotropic 
evaluations were not tested (Harper, 2000:1212). 
53
 Economics perceptions are significant with trust and political information (Interaction effect) for Hungary only 
Cross-National Studies in Central and Eastern Europe 
Authors Country Time  Sample n-size Methodology Significant 
economic variables 
Pacek, 1994 Poland, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia 
1990-1992 Poland, 1990: 49 
Poland, 1991: 32 
Bulgar., 1991: 28 
Czecho, 1992: 12 
Macro-level Unemployment 
Duch, 1995 USSR, Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia 
1990-1991 USSR: 1561 
Czechoslovakia: 899 
Hungary:964 
Poland: 1462 
Micro-level Prospective 
Fidrmuc
50
, 2000 Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia 
1992-1998 442 Macro-level Prospective 
Fidemuc
51
, 
2000 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia 
1992-1998 Czech Republic: 76 
Slovakia: 38 
Hungary: 20 
Poland: 49 
Macro-level Prospective, 
Unemployment 
Harper, 2000 Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 1992-1994 Lithuania, 1992: 770 
Hungary, 1993: 582 
Bulgaria, 1994: 719 
Micro-level Pocketbook
52
 
Tucker, 2001 Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic 
1990-1996 32 Macro-level Unemployment, income, 
industrial growth 
Duch, 2001 Hungary & Poland 1997 Hungary, 1997: 1498 
Poland, 1997: 1199 
Micro-level RS & PS
53
 
Roberts, 2008 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
1992-2006 34 Macro-level Unemployment 
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Single-Country Studies in Africa 
Author(s) Country Time 
Period 
Sample 
n-size 
Methodology President/ 
elections/ 
Parties 
Theoretically and 
Methodologically 
Significant 
Economic Variables 
Posner, 2002 Zambia 1991,1996 Macro: 39 Macro/Micro Kaunda & Chiluba poverty 
Youde, 2005 Ghana 1999 1957 Micro-level NDC Prospective 
Tche, 2009 Cameroon 1982-2006 3 Macro-level Paul Biya GDP growth 
    
 
Cross-National Studies in Africa 
Authors Country Time 
Period 
Sample n-
size 
Methodology Significant 
economic variables 
Bratton et al., 
2012 
Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia 
2005 23,039 Micro-level Prospective, sociotropic 
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Single-Country Studies in Asia 
Author(s) Country Time 
Period 
Sample 
n-size 
Methodology President/ 
elections/ 
Parties 
Theoretically and 
Methodologically 
Significant 
Economic Variables 
Meyer & Malcolm, 1993 India 1957-1984 State: 83 
National: 7 
Macro-level Parliamentary GDP 
Tandon, 2010 India 1991-1996 
1991-2004 
472 Micro-level Parliamentary Tariff 
Wade & Kang, 1990 Korea 1988 224 Macro-level Parliamentary Unemployment 
Lee, 2011 Korea 2007 Macro: 5 
Micro:945 
Macro-level & 
Micro-level 
Presidential Retrospective & 
Sociotropic 
Lee & Glasure, 2012 Korea 2003 1498-1500 Micro-level -  Retrospective & 
Sociotropic 
Kang, 2013 Korea 2007 2206 Micro-level Presidential Sociotropic 
Hsieh et al., 1998 Taiwan 1996 1003 Micro-level Presidential Prospective 
Choi, 2012 Taiwan 1996,2004 1996: 890 
2004:1172 
Micro-level Presidential Sociotropic (++), 
pocketbook (+) 
Carkoglu, 1997 Turkey 1950-1995 21 Macro-level Parliamentary, 
local 
Inflation, 
unemployment  
Esmer, 2002 Turkey 1999 1741 Micro-level Parliamentary No economic voting 
Hazama, 2006 Turkey 2002 1807 Micro-level Parliamentary Pocketbook-
Retrospective and 
sociotropic-
prospective 
Akarca & Tansel, 2006 Turkey 1950-2004 27 Macro-level Parliamentary, 
local 
Growth Rate, 
Inflation 
Akarca & Tansel, 2007 Turkey 1995 62 Macro-level Parliamentary Growth Rate 
Sheafter, 2008 Israel 1955-2003 V function: 14 
P function: 7-10 
Macro-level Parliamentary Growth Rate, 
unemployment 
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Appendix B: Tabulation between Vote Intention and Economic Perceptions 
Tabulation between vote and retrospective-sociotropic 
 
Tabulation between vote and prospective-sociotropic 
 
 
 
 
                 49.24      50.76      100.00 
     Total      22,595     23,291      45,886 
                                             
                 40.24      59.76      100.00 
         2         901      1,338       2,239 
                                             
                 40.09      59.91      100.00 
         1       5,332      7,967      13,299 
                                             
                 47.99      52.01      100.00 
         0       6,659      7,217      13,876 
                                             
                 57.37      42.63      100.00 
        -1       6,567      4,880      11,447 
                                             
                 62.41      37.59      100.00 
        -2       3,136      1,889       5,025 
                                             
         2           0          1       Total
RetroSocio      Vote Intention
                 49.33      50.67      100.00 
     Total      20,884     21,449      42,333 
                                             
                 35.62      64.38      100.00 
         2       1,831      3,310       5,141 
                                             
                 41.59      58.41      100.00 
         1       6,899      9,688      16,587 
                                             
                 54.46      45.54      100.00 
         0       5,663      4,736      10,399 
                                             
                 62.72      37.28      100.00 
        -1       4,058      2,412       6,470 
                                             
                 65.12      34.88      100.00 
        -2       2,433      1,303       3,736 
                                             
 ProSocio2           0          1       Total
                Vote Intention
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Tabulation between vote and prospective-egotropic 
 
 
Tabulation between vote and retrospective-egotropic 
 
 
A tabulation of perceptions of the economy and the vote demonstrates that, for the most 
part, economic perceptions behave in the predicted manner with vote intention. However, 
                 49.26      50.74      100.00 
     Total      20,994     21,622      42,616 
                                             
                 42.71      57.29      100.00 
         2       2,525      3,387       5,912 
                                             
                 44.67      55.33      100.00 
         1       8,166     10,115      18,281 
                                             
                 53.49      46.51      100.00 
         0       6,027      5,241      11,268 
                                             
                 59.99      40.01      100.00 
        -1       2,862      1,909       4,771 
                                             
                 59.31      40.69      100.00 
        -2       1,414        970       2,384 
                                             
   ProEgo2           0          1       Total
                Vote Intention
                  
                 49.20      50.80      100.00 
     Total      22,724     23,464      46,188 
                                             
                 45.13      54.87      100.00 
         2       1,112      1,352       2,464 
                                             
                 44.01      55.99      100.00 
         1       5,991      7,623      13,614 
                                             
                 49.10      50.90      100.00 
         0       8,472      8,784      17,256 
                                             
                 55.53      44.47      100.00 
        -1       5,318      4,259       9,577 
                                             
                 55.87      44.13      100.00 
        -2       1,831      1,446       3,277 
                                             
 RetroEgo2           0          1       Total
                Vote Intention
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with respect to retrospective egotropic evaluations (table 4.6) higher evaluation of 
personal economic well being doesn’t necessarily result in greater probability of 
incumbent vote. In fact, as positive evaluations of retrospective personal economic well-
being increases the likelihood of vote intention actually decreases! Specifically, the 
probability of voting for the incumbent party (given better economic well-being) is .56, 
while the probability of voting for the incumbent party (given much better economic 
well-being is .55. The diminishing effect is strictly limited to positive evaluations of 
personal evaluations of economic well-being, with negative evaluations demonstrating 
the intended effect. 
 Furthermore, the coefficients for egotropic evaluations in the full model (table 
5.7) are in the wrong direction. Thus, in order to properly identify (and not overestimate) 
the association between economic perceptions and the vote, it is necessary to omit 
egotropic evaluations for several reasons. First, egotropic evaluations display an unusual 
high collinearity with other economic perceptions. Second, egotropic evaluations behave 
in the opposite manner. Finally, an increase in retrospective, egotropic perceptions 
doesn’t necessarily correspond with higher probability of incumbent vote.   
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Appendix C: Country and Election Samples 
Macro-level data 
Country Elections Observed 
Albania 2005,2009 
Argentina 1983,1985,1987,1989,1991,1993,1995,1997,1999,2001,2003,2005,2007,2009, 
2011 
Armenia 1999 
Bangladesh 1991,1996,2001 
Benin 1991,1995,1999,2003,2007,2011 
Bolivia 1985,1989,1993,1997,2002,2005,2009 
Botswana 1984,1989,1994,1999,2004,2009 
Brazil 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
Bulgaria 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 
Burundi 2005, 2010 
Cape Verde 1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011 
Chile 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 
Colombia 1982, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
Costa Rica 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
Croatia 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Dominican 
Republic 
1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
Ecuador 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006 
El Salvador 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 
Gambia 1982, 1987, 1992 
Georgia 2004, 2008, 2012 
Ghana 2004, 2008, 2012 
Guatemala 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
Honduras 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 
Hungary 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
India 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996,1999, 2004, 2009 
Indonesia 1999, 2004, 2009 
Jamaica 1980, 1983, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011 
Kenya 2002, 2007 
Kosovo 2010 
Latvia 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011 
Lebanon 2005, 2009 
Lesotho 1993, 2002, 2007, 2012 
Liberia 2011 
Lithuania 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 
Macedonia 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011 
Madagascar 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007 
Malawi 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Malaysia 2008 
Mali 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 
Mauritius 1982, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Mexico 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 
Moldova 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 
Mongolia 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 
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Montenegro 2006, 2009, 2012 
Namibia 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Nepal 1999, 2008 
Nicaragua 1990, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 
Pakistan 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997 
Panama 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Paraguay 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 
Peru 1980, 1985, 1990, 2000, 2001, 2006, 2011 
Philippines 1987, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Poland 1991. 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 
Romania 1996,2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 
Russia 2003 
Senegal 2001, 2007, 2012 
Serbia 2007, 2008, 2012 
Sierra Leone 2007, 2012 
South Africa 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Sri Lanka 2001 
Thailand 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2011 
Turkey 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2011 
Ukraine 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012 
Uruguay 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Venezuela  1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2005 
Zambia 1991, 2008 
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Micro-level Data 
Country Barometer 
Argentina Latino2005; Latino2008 
Benin Afro 3; Afro 4 
Bolivia Latino2005; Latino2008 
Botswana Afro 3; Afro 4 
Brazil Latino2005; Latino2008 
Cape Verde Afro 3; Afro 4 
Chile Latino2005; Latino2008 
Colombia Latino2005; Latino2008 
Costa Rica Latino2005; Latino2008 
Dominican Republic Latino2005; Latino2008 
Ecuador Latino2005; Latino2008 
El Salvador Latino2005; Latino2008 
Ghana Afro3;  Afro 4 
Guatemala Latino2005; Latino2008 
Honduras Latino2005; Latino2008 
Kenya Afro 3; Afro 4 
Lesotho Afro 3; Afro 4 
Liberia Afro 4 
Madagascar Afro 3; Afro 4 
Malawi Afro 3; Afro 4 
Mali Afro 3; Afro 4 
Mexico Latino2005; Latino2008 
Namibia Afro 3; Afro 4 
Nicaragua Latino2005; Latino2008 
Panama Latino2005; Latino2008 
Paraguay Latino2005; Latino2008 
Peru Latino2005; Latino2008 
Senegal Afro 3; Afro 4 
South Africa Afro 3; Afro 4 
Uruguay Latino2005; Latino2008 
Venezuela Latino2005; Latino2008 
Zambia Afro 3; Afro 4 
  
1
3
4 
Significance of macro-level economic covariates in all trials 
 Cross-Regional Models Region-Specific Models 
 Full 
Model 
Growth 
Model 
Growth & 
Unemployment 
Model 
Growth 
& 
Inflation 
Model 
Latin 
America 
Model 
Africa 
Model 
CEE 
Model 
Asia 
Model 
Latin 
America 
(1980-
88) 
Covariates          
Growth .63*** .50*** .61*** .49*** .47** -.25 .73*** .18 .63 
Unemployment .23*  .20    .03  -.014* 
Inflation .30   .09 .48   -2.1  
 
 
Significance of micro-level economic covariates in all trials 
 Cross-Regional Models Region-Specific Models 
 Full Model Sociotropic 
Model 
Voter 
Heterogeneity 
Model 
Multi-
level 
Model 
Latin 
America 
Model 
Africa 
Model 
Covariates       
Retrospective, Sociotropic .21*** .20*** .09** .18*** .23*** .15*** 
Retrospective, Egotropic -.03*      
Prospective, Sociotropic .30*** .29*** .09** .24*** .31*** .21*** 
Prospective, Egotropic -.02      
 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10
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1
3
5 
 
 Cross-Regional Models 
 Full Model Growth Model Growth + 
Unemployment Model 
Growth + Inflation 
Model 
 LDV AR1 LDV AR1 LDV AR1 LDV AR1 
Covariates         
Growth .63*** .68*** .50*** .62*** .61*** .64*** .49*** .61*** 
Unemployment .23* .33*   .20 .27   
Inflation .30 .17     .09 -.25 
 
 
 
 Region-Specific Models 
 Latin America 
Model 
Africa Model CEE Model Asia Model 
 LDV AR1 LDV AR1 LDV AR1 LDV AR1 
Covariates         
Growth .46** .49* -.25 .08 .73*** .62*** .18 .23 
Unemployment     .03 .15   
Inflation .48 -.04     -2.1 .996 
 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <0.10
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